display all the ideas for this combination of texts
16 ideas
6648 | Some behaviourists believe thought is just suppressed speech [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Some behaviourists have held the view that thinking just is, in effect, suppressed speech. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 7) | |
A reaction: He cites J.B.Watson. This would imply that infants and animals can't think. Introspecting my own case, I don't believe it. When I am navigating through a town, for example, I directly relate to my mental map; I see little sign of anything verbal. |
23311 | Aristotle sees reason as much more specific than our more everyday concept of it [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: It seems that Aristotle does not associate reason primarily with ordinary, everyday thought and reasoning, as we do, but with a much more specific function of reason. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 980b) by Michael Frede - Aristotle's Rationalism p.163 | |
A reaction: Although Aristotle is naturalistic, he is also a bit of a dualist, and so is less keen than I am to connect human reason with sensible behaviour in animals. |
6651 | People are wildly inaccurate in estimating probabilities about an observed event [Lowe] |
Full Idea: In the 'cab problem' (what colour was the cab in the accident?) most people estimate an 80% probability of it being a blue cab, but Bayes' Theorem calculates the probability at 41%, suggesting people put too much faith in eyewitness testimony. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: For details of the 'cab problem', see Lowe p.200. My suspicion is that people get into a tangle when confronted with numbers in a theoretical situation, but are much better at it when faced with a real life problem, like 'who ate my chocolate?' |
6652 | 'Base rate neglect' makes people favour the evidence over its background [Lowe] |
Full Idea: 'Base rate neglect' (attending to the witness or evidence, and ignoring background information) is responsible for doctors exaggerating the significance of positive results in diagnosis of relatively rare medical conditions. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: This seems to be one of the clearest cases where people's behaviour is irrational, though I suspect that people are much more rational about things if the case is simple and non-numerical. However, people are very credulous about wonderful events. |
23300 | Aristotle and the Stoics denied rationality to animals, while Platonists affirmed it [Aristotle, by Sorabji] |
Full Idea: Aristotle, and also the Stoics, denied rationality to animals. …The Platonists, the Pythagoreans, and some more independent Aristotelians, did grant reason and intellect to animals. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Richard Sorabji - Rationality 'Denial' | |
A reaction: This is not the same as affirming or denying their consciousness. The debate depends on how rationality is conceived. |
23310 | Animals live by sensations, and some have good memories, but they don't connect experiences [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: By nature animals are born with the faculty of sensation, and from sensation memory is produced in some of them, though not in others; therefore the former are more intelligent. …Animals live by appearances and memories, with little connected experience. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 980a28-) | |
A reaction: I assume that larger animals make judgements, which have to rely on previous experiences, so I think he underestimates the cleverest animals. We now know about Caledonian Crows, which amaze us, and would have amazed Aristotle. |
11245 | Many memories make up a single experience [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Many recollections of the same thing perform the function of a single experience. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 0980b28) | |
A reaction: This beautifully simple remark seems to me to be extremely important if we are going to understand the nature of thought. Personally I think it endorses the 'database' view of how the mind works (as a set of labelled 'files'). See Fodor's 'LOT2'. |
6655 | The 'Frame Problem' is how to program the appropriate application of general knowledge [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The 'Frame Problem' in artificial intelligence is how to write a program which not only embodies people's general knowledge, but specifies how that knowledge is to be applied appropriately, when circumstances can't be specified in advance. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: As Lowe observes, this is a problem, but not necessarily an impossibility. There should be a way to symbolically map the concepts of knowledge onto the concepts of perception, just as we must do. |
6657 | Computers can't be rational, because they lack motivation and curiosity [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Lack of motivation and curiosity are perhaps the most fundamental reason for denying that computers could be, in any literal sense, rational beings. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 9) | |
A reaction: I don't see why programmers couldn't move those two priorities to the top of the list in the program. When you switch on a robot, its first words could be 'Teach me something!', or 'Let's do something interesting!' Every piece of software has priorities. |
6656 | The Turing test is too behaviourist, and too verbal in its methods [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The Turing test is open to the objection that it is inspired by behaviourist assumptions and focuses too narrowly on verbal evidence of intelligence. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 8) | |
A reaction: This is part of the objection that the test exhibits human chauvinism, and robots and aliens are wasting their time trying to pass it. You need human behaviour, especially speech, to do well. Inarticulate people can exhibit high practical intelligence. |
6636 | The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The leading naturalistic theories of what it is that confers a specific content upon a given attitudinal state are the causal theory, and the teleological theory, both of which contain serious difficulties. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: 'Causal' theories (Fodor) say the world directly causes content; 'teleological' theories (Millikan, Papineau) are based on the evolutionary purpose of content for the subject. I agree that neither seems adequate… |
6633 | Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The implication of considerations of Twin Earth cases is that even beliefs about the properties of kinds of stuff are implicitly indexical, or context-dependent, in character. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Ch. 4) | |
A reaction: This is a significant connection, between debates about the nature of indexicals (such as 'I' and 'this') and externalism about content generally. Is there no distinction between objective reference and contextual reference? |
10954 | It is unclear whether acute angles are prior to right angles, or fingers to men [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Suppose parts are prior to the whole - then, since the acute angle is a part of the right angle, and a finger is part of an animal, this would mean the acute angle and the finger were prior, but received opinion says otherwise. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1034b24) |
9792 | Mathematicians study quantity and continuity, and remove the perceptible features of things [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The mathematician conducts a study into things in abstraction (after the removal of all perceptible features, such as weight and hardness, leaving only quantity and continuity). | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1061a26) | |
A reaction: Frege complained that there is nothing left if you remove the perceptible features, but clearly Aristotle is not an empiricist in this passage, and it is doubtful if even Mill can be totally empirical in his account. We have relations of ideas. |
9077 | Mathematicians suppose inseparable aspects to be separable, and study them in isolation [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Study things as mathematicians do. Suppose what is not separable to be separable. A man qua man is an indivisible unity, so the arithmetician supposes a man to be an indivisible unity, and investigates the accidental features of man qua indivisible. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1078a19) | |
A reaction: This is the abstractionist view of mathematics. Qua indivisible, a man will have the same properties as a toothbrush. Aristotle clearly intends the method for scientists as well. It strikes me as common sense, but there is a lot of modern caution. |
9075 | If health happened to be white, the science of health would not study whiteness [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: If we have a science of the healthy, and the healthy happens to be white, the science of the healthy does not deal with the white. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1077b30) | |
A reaction: Given this point, we certainly cannot think of Aristotle as believing in simple abstractionism. The problem of the coextension of renates and cordates looms here (Idea 7317). 'Relevant' similarities require extensive cross-referencing. |