Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Physics', 'An Introduction to Modal Logic' and 'The Logical Structure of the World (Aufbau)'

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3 ideas

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / g. Conceptual atomism
All concepts can be derived from a few basics, making possible one science of everything [Carnap, by Brody]
     Full Idea: In the 'Aufbau', Carnap tried to show how all of our concepts can be derived from a few basic concepts. ..Consequently there can be one science which studied all that existed, the science of the objects corresponding to the basic concepts.
     From: report of Rudolph Carnap (The Logical Structure of the World (Aufbau) [1928]) by Baruch Brody - Identity and Essence 2.2
     A reaction: This is Carnap's Constructionist programme.
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
You can't abstract natural properties to make Forms - objects and attributes are defined together [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Those who say there are Forms abstract natural properties, even though they are less separable than mathematical properties. This is clear if you try to define both the objects themselves and their attributes.
     From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 193b36)
     A reaction: (Compare Idea 9788) This is Frege's black and white cats, where you cannot abstract the black without thinking of the cat, but Aristotle thinks mathematical abstraction is more feasible.
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
Mathematicians study what is conceptually separable, and doesn't lead to error [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Mathematicians abstract properties which are conceptually separable from the world of change. It makes no difference if you treat them as separate, in the sense that it does not result in error.
     From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 193b33)
     A reaction: This strikes me as a crucial point to make against Frege (if Aristotle is right). Frege hates abstractionism precisely because it is psychological, and hence admits subjective error, instead of objective truth. Does 'pure' abstraction avoid error?