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Ideas for 'works', 'Letters to Samuel Clarke' and 'Truly Understood'

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4 ideas

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference [Peacocke]
     Full Idea: My basic Fregean idea is that a sense is individuated by the fundamental condition for something to be its reference.
     From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], Intro)
     A reaction: For something to actually be its reference (as opposed to imagined reference), truth must be involved. This needs the post-1891 Frege view of such things, and not just the view of concepts as functions which he started with.
Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions [Peacocke]
     Full Idea: The Fregean view is that the essence of a concept is given by the fundamental condition for something to be its reference.
     From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], 2.1)
     A reaction: Peacocke is a supporter of the Fregean view. How does this work for concepts of odd creatures in a fantasy novel? Or for mistaken or confused concepts? For Burge's 'arthritis in my thigh'? I don't reject the Fregean view.
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms [Peacocke]
     Full Idea: For each concept, there will be some reasons or norms distinctive of that concept.
     From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], 2.3)
     A reaction: This is Peacocke's bold Fregean thesis (and it sounds rather Kantian to me). I dislike the word 'norms' (long story), but reasons are interesting. The trouble is the distinction between being a reason for something (its cause) and being a reason for me.
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth [Peacocke]
     Full Idea: For some particular concept, we can argue that some of its distinctive features are adequately explained only by a possession-condition that involves reference and truth essentially.
     From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], Intro)
     A reaction: He reached this view via the earlier assertion that it is the role in judgement which key to understanding concepts. I like any view of such things which says that truth plays a role.