23311
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Aristotle sees reason as much more specific than our more everyday concept of it [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
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Full Idea:
It seems that Aristotle does not associate reason primarily with ordinary, everyday thought and reasoning, as we do, but with a much more specific function of reason.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 980b) by Michael Frede - Aristotle's Rationalism p.163
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A reaction:
Although Aristotle is naturalistic, he is also a bit of a dualist, and so is less keen than I am to connect human reason with sensible behaviour in animals.
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23310
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Animals live by sensations, and some have good memories, but they don't connect experiences [Aristotle]
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Full Idea:
By nature animals are born with the faculty of sensation, and from sensation memory is produced in some of them, though not in others; therefore the former are more intelligent. …Animals live by appearances and memories, with little connected experience.
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From:
Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 980a28-)
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A reaction:
I assume that larger animals make judgements, which have to rely on previous experiences, so I think he underestimates the cleverest animals. We now know about Caledonian Crows, which amaze us, and would have amazed Aristotle.
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4889
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Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change [Perry]
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Full Idea:
Although we classify ideas by content for many purposes, we do not individuate them by content. The content of an idea can change.
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From:
John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §3.2)
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A reaction:
As the compiler of this database, I find this very appealing. The mind works exactly like a database. I have a 'file' (Perry's word) marked "London", the content of which undergoes continual change. I am a database management system.
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4896
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The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension [Perry]
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Full Idea:
In possible-worlds semantics, expressions have intensions, which are functions from possible worlds to appropriate extensions (names to individuals, n-place predicates to n-tuples, and sentences to truth values, built from parts).
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From:
John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §8.1)
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A reaction:
Interesting. Perry distinguishes 'referential' (or 'subject matter') content, which is prior to the link to extensions - a link which creates 'reflexive' content. He is keen that they should not become confused. True knowledge is 'situated'.
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9077
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Mathematicians suppose inseparable aspects to be separable, and study them in isolation [Aristotle]
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Full Idea:
Study things as mathematicians do. Suppose what is not separable to be separable. A man qua man is an indivisible unity, so the arithmetician supposes a man to be an indivisible unity, and investigates the accidental features of man qua indivisible.
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From:
Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1078a19)
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A reaction:
This is the abstractionist view of mathematics. Qua indivisible, a man will have the same properties as a toothbrush. Aristotle clearly intends the method for scientists as well. It strikes me as common sense, but there is a lot of modern caution.
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