Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Truly Understood', 'Rule Utilitarianism and Euthanasia' and 'Morality and the emotions'

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3 ideas

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
Reference to a person's emotions is often essential to understanding their actions [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: The reference to a man's emotions has a significance for our understanding of his moral sincerity, not as a substitute for or addition to how he acts, but as, on occasion, underlying our understanding of how he acts.
     From: Bernard Williams (Morality and the emotions [1965], p.223)
     A reaction: Williams aims to rescue emotion from the emotivists, and replace it at the centre of traditional modes of moral judgement. I suppose we could assess one rogue robot as behaving 'badly' in a community of robots.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
Moral education must involve learning about various types of feeling towards things [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: If moral education does not revolve around what to fear, to be angry about, to despise, and where to draw the line between kindness and a stupid sentimentality - I do not know what it is. (Though there are principles, of truth-telling and justice).
     From: Bernard Williams (Morality and the emotions [1965], p.225)
     A reaction: He cites Aristotle as the obvious source of this correct idea. The examples of principle both require us to place a high value on truth and justice, and not just follow rules in the style of arithmetic.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality [Peacocke]
     Full Idea: 'Concept' is a notion tied, in the classical Fregean manner, to cognitive significance. Concepts are distinct if we can judge rationally of one, without the other. Concepts are constitutively and definitionally tied to rationality in this way.
     From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], 2.2)
     A reaction: It seems to a bit optimistic to say, more or less, that thinking is impossible if it isn't rational. Rational beings have been selected for. As Quine nicely observed, duffers at induction have all been weeded out - but they may have existed, briefly.