display all the ideas for this combination of texts
3 ideas
| 23554 | Judgements can be unreflective and non-inferential, yet rational, by being sensitive to experience [Fricker,M] |
| Full Idea: Our idea of testimonial sensibility is a spontaneous critical sensitivity permanently in training and adapting to experience. …This gives us a picture of how judgements can be rational yet unreflective, critical yet non-inferential. | |
| From: Miranda Fricker (Epistemic Injustice [2007], 3.4) | |
| A reaction: Love this. I want to connect human reasoning to good judgement by animals, and I offer the word 'sensible' to bridge the gap. Dogs and scientists can be sensible. Fricker spells out more fully what I have in mind, with reference to testimony. |
| 19271 | No rule can be fully explained [Kripke] |
| Full Idea: Every explanation of a rule could conceivably be misunderstood. | |
| From: Saul A. Kripke (Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language [1982], 3) | |
| A reaction: This is Kripke's summary of what he takes to be Wittgenstein's scepticism about rules. |
| 19269 | 'Quus' means the same as 'plus' if the ingredients are less than 57; otherwise it just produces 5 [Kripke] |
| Full Idea: I will define 'quus' by x-quus-y = x + y, if x, y < 57, and otherwise it equals 5. Who is to say that this is not the function I previously meant by '+'? | |
| From: Saul A. Kripke (Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language [1982], 2) | |
| A reaction: Kripke's famous example, to illustrate the big new scepticism introduced by Wittgenstein's questions about the rationality of following a rule. I suspect that you have to delve into psychology to understand rule-following, rather than logic. |