Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Locke on Human Understanding', 'Psychophysical and theoretical identifications' and 'Universals'

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2 ideas

18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
     Full Idea: 'Mentalese' would be neither conventional nor a means of public communication so that even to call it a language is seriously misleading.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.7)
     A reaction: It is, however, supposed to contain symbolic representations which are then used as tokens for computation, so it seems close to a language, if (for example) symbolic logic or mathematics were accepted as languages. But who understands it?
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
It is always open to a philosopher to claim that some entity or other is unanalysable [Moreland]
     Full Idea: It is always open to a philosopher to claim that some entity or other is unanalysable.
     From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.2)
     A reaction: For example, Davidson on truth. There is an onus to demonstrate why all attempted analyses fail.