Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Reasoning and the Logic of Things' and 'Vagueness'

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4 ideas

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
To know, believe, hope or fear, one must grasp the thought, but not when you fail to do them [Williamson]
     Full Idea: To know, believe, hope, or fear that A, one must grasp the thought that A. In contrast, to fail to know, believe, hope or fear that A, one need not grasp the thought that A.
     From: Timothy Williamson (Vagueness [1994], 9.3 c)
     A reaction: A simple point, which at least shows that propositional attitudes are a two-stage operation.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Reasoning involves observation, experiment, and habituation [Peirce]
     Full Idea: The mental operations concerning in reasoning are three. The first is Observation; the second is Experimentation; and the third is Habituation.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], V)
     A reaction: I like the breadth of this. Even those who think scientific reasoning has priority over logic (as I do, thinking of it as the evaluation of evidence, with Sherlock Holmes as its role model) will be surprised to finding observation and habituation there.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
Everybody overrates their own reasoning, so it is clearly superficial [Peirce]
     Full Idea: The very fact that everybody so ridiculously overrates his own reasoning, is sufficient to show how superficial the faculty is.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Reasoning and the Logic of Things [1898], I)
     A reaction: A nice remark. The obvious counter-thought is that the collective reasoning of mankind really has been rather impressive, even though people haven't yet figured out how to live at peace with one another.
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / h. Family resemblance
'Blue' is not a family resemblance, because all the blues resemble in some respect [Williamson]
     Full Idea: 'Blue' is vague by some standards, for it has borderline cases, but that does not make it a family resemblance term, for all the shades of blue resemble each other in some respect.
     From: Timothy Williamson (Vagueness [1994], 3.3)
     A reaction: Presumably the point of family resemblance is that fringe members as still linked to the family, despite having lost the main features. A bit of essentialism seems needed here.