display all the ideas for this combination of texts
4 ideas
23475 | The form of a proposition must show why nonsense is unjudgeable [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: The correct explanation of the form of the proposition 'A judges p' must show that it is impossible to judge a nonsense. (Russell's theory does not satisfy this condition). | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 5.5422) | |
A reaction: In Notebooks p.96 LW gives the example 'this table penholders the book'. I take it Russell wanted judgement to impose unified meaning on sentences, but LW shows that assembling meaning must precede judgement. LW is right. |
8248 | Phenomenology says thought is part of the world [Deleuze/Guattari] |
Full Idea: According to phenomenology, thought depends on man's relations with the world - with which the brain is necessarily in agreement because it is drawn from these relations. | |
From: G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], Conclusion) | |
A reaction: The development of externalist views of mind, arising from the Twin Earth idea, seems to provide a link to continental philosophy, where similar ideas are found in Husserl, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. So study science, psychology, or sociology? |
8245 | The logical attitude tries to turn concepts into functions, when they are really forms or forces [Deleuze/Guattari] |
Full Idea: Logic is reductionist not accidentally, but essentially and necessarily: following the route marked out by Frege and Russell, it wants to turn the concept into a function (...when actually a concept is a form, or a force). | |
From: G Deleuze / F Guattari (What is Philosophy? [1991], 2.6) | |
A reaction: [Last part on p.144] I'm not sure that I understand 'form or force', but the idea that concepts are mere functions is like describing something as 'transport', without saying whether it is bus/bike/train.. Is a concept a vision, or a tool? |
7084 | What can be said is what can be thought, so language shows the limits of thought [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: In Wittgenstein's view, what can be said is the same as what can be thought; so that once one has grasped the nature of language, one has shown the limit beyond which language and thought become nonsense. | |
From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921]) by A.C. Grayling - Wittgenstein Ch.2 | |
A reaction: I just don't believe that what is thinkable is limited to what is expressible. A lot of philosophy is the struggle to find expression for thoughts which are just beyond the edge of current language. See Idea 6870. |