Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Logical Pluralism', 'The Universe as We Find It' and 'Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts'

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5 ideas

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
You can think of tomatoes without grasping what they are [Heil]
     Full Idea: You can entertain thoughts of things like tomatoes without a grasp of what they are.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 08.10)
     A reaction: Lowe seemed to think that you had to grasp the generic essence of a tomato before you could think about it, but I agree entirely with Heil.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
Judgement is always predicating a property of a subject [Beall/Restall]
     Full Idea: All judgement, for Kant, is essentially the predication of some property to some subject.
     From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 2.5)
     A reaction: Presumably the denial of a predicate could be a judgement, or the affirmation of ambiguous predicates?
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 8. Human Thought
Non-conscious thought may be unlike conscious thought [Heil]
     Full Idea: Non-conscious thought need not resemble conscious thought occurring out of sight.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 12.10)
Linguistic thought is just as imagistic as non-linguistic thought [Heil]
     Full Idea: Thinking - ordinary conscious thinking - is imagistic. This is so for 'linguistic' or 'sentential' thoughts as well as for patently non-linguistic thoughts.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 12.10)
     A reaction: This claim (that linguistic thought is just as imagistic as non-linguistic thought) strikes me as an excellent insight.
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
There is a single file per object, memorised, reactivated, consolidated and expanded [Papineau, by Recanati]
     Full Idea: For Papineau there is just one file, which is initialised on the first encounter with the object, stored in memory, reactivated on further encounters, and consolidated with familiarity. Accumulation of information shows it is the same file.
     From: report of David Papineau (Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts [2006]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 7.2
     A reaction: Recanati attempts to refute this view, defending a more complex taxonomy of files. I'm sympathetic to Papineau, as distinct shift in file type doesn't sound very plausible. Simplicity suggests Papineau as a better starting-point.