display all the ideas for this combination of texts
3 ideas
2438 | In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Semantics, according to the informational view, is mostly about counterfactuals; what counts for the identity of my concepts is not what I do distinguish but what I could distinguish if I cared to (even using instruments and experts). | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §2.I) | |
A reaction: We all differ in our discriminations (and awareness of expertise), so our concepts would differ, which is bad news for communication (see Idea 223). The view has some plausibility, though. |
18752 | 'The concept "horse"' denotes a concept, yet seems also to denote an object [Frege, by McGee] |
Full Idea: The phrase 'the concept "horse"' can be the subject of a sentence, and ought to denote an object. But it clearly denotes the concept "horse". Yet Fregean concepts are said to be 'incomplete' objects, which led to confusion. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (On Sense and Reference [1892]) by Vann McGee - Logical Consequence 4 | |
A reaction: This is the notorious 'concept "horse"' problem, which was bad news for Frege's idea of a concept. |
8155 | Without speech we cannot know right/wrong, true/false, good/bad, or pleasant/unpleasant [Anon (Upan)] |
Full Idea: If there were no speech, neither right nor wrong would be known, neither the true nor the false, neither the good nor the bad, neither the pleasant nor the unpleasant. | |
From: Anon (Upan) (The Upanishads [c.950 BCE], 'Chandogya') | |
A reaction: This could stand as the epigraph for the whole of modern philosophy of language. However, the text goes on to say that mind is higher than speech. The test question is the mental capabilities of animals. Do they 'know' pleasure, or truth? |