display all the ideas for this combination of texts
4 ideas
| 12576 | Possessing a concept is knowing how to go on [Wittgenstein, by Peacocke] |
| Full Idea: Wittgenstein implies that which concepts a thinker is capable of possessing depends on the ways in which he is capable of finding a natural way to go on. | |
| From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952]) by Christopher Peacocke - A Study of Concepts 1.2 | |
| A reaction: This doesn't seem to amount to much. Presumably someone who failed to grasp a concept would demonstrate the fact by going on in a silly way, and whether or not it was silly might not be obvious. A genius may go on in a quirky way. |
| 4157 | Concepts direct our interests and investigations, and express those interests [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Concepts lead us to make investigations; are the expression of our interest, and direct our interest. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §570) | |
| A reaction: This presumably points to the evolutionary origin of our concept-creating capacity, though I am not sure that it defines what a concept actually is. |
| 12606 | Man learns the concept of the past by remembering [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Man learns the concept of the past by remembering. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], II.13) | |
| A reaction: [quoted by Peacocke] Is it the case that we learn all of our concepts by doing? Obviously not, since we can be taught them. Could you have no long-term memories (head trauma), and be taught the concept of the past by someone else? |
| 4141 | Various games have a 'family resemblance', as their similarities overlap and criss-cross [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: I shall say 'games' form a family, with a 'family resemblance', for the resemblances within a family - build, eyes, temperament etc. - overlap and criss-cross in the same way. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §067) | |
| A reaction: A very helpful idea for the nominalist view of universals, particularly for showing how concepts shade off indeterminately at the edges. |