display all the ideas for this combination of texts
3 ideas
4269 | An emotion is a motive which is also a feeling [Scruton] |
Full Idea: An emotion is a motive which is also a feeling. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.17) | |
A reaction: What is a motive without feeling? A universalised judgment, perhaps. Which comes first, the motivation or the feeling? |
4270 | Do we use reason to distinguish people from animals, or use that difference to define reason? [Scruton] |
Full Idea: The difficulty of defining reason suggests that while pretending to use it to define the difference between humans and animals, they are actually using that difference to define reason. | |
From: Roger Scruton (Animal Rights and Wrongs [1996], p.19) | |
A reaction: Too pessimistic. We are perfectly capable of saying there is no significant difference between us and an alien. We have obvious abilities, which we can partly specify. |
13239 | Judgement is always predicating a property of a subject [Beall/Restall] |
Full Idea: All judgement, for Kant, is essentially the predication of some property to some subject. | |
From: JC Beall / G Restall (Logical Pluralism [2006], 2.5) | |
A reaction: Presumably the denial of a predicate could be a judgement, or the affirmation of ambiguous predicates? |