5335
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Emotions are usually very apt, rather than being non-rational and fickle [Flanagan]
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Full Idea:
One can question the idea that emotions are non-rational, fickle and flighty; on the contrary, emotions normally seem to be very apt.
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From:
Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p. 16)
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A reaction:
This is the modern view of emotion which is emerging from neuroscience, which is greatly superior to traditional views, apart from Aristotle, who felt that wisdom and virtue arose precisely when emotions were apt for the situation.
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5160
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There is a mean of feelings, as in our responses to the good or bad fortune of others [Aristotle]
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Full Idea:
There are mean states also in the sphere of feelings. …The man who feels righteous indignation is distressed at instances of undeserved good fortune, but the envious man is distressed at any good fortune, and the spiteful man rejoices at bad fortune.
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From:
Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1108a29)
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A reaction:
This example captures nicely the crucial point that Aristotle wants our actions and responses to be appropriate, rather than just restrained. The disciple of Aristotle does not conduct himself like a cold Stoic, but has lively responses to situations.
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4326
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Aristotle gives a superior account of rationality, because he allows emotions to participate [Hursthouse on Aristotle]
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Full Idea:
Aristotle gives a superior account of human rationality, because he allows emotions to participate in reason, rather than being mere animal, non-rational impulses.
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From:
comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Rosalind Hursthouse - On Virtue Ethics Intro
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A reaction:
This is obviously helpful in virtue ethics, but it is a bit questionable, if the core of rationality is 'giving reasons'. A feeling might be a reason, but only once it has been conceptualised. "For RLS, his feelings were his reasons", said Henry James.
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