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Ideas for 'Explanation in Mathematics', 'Dthat' and 'Mental Files'

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15 ideas

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
Indexicals apply to singular thought, and mental files have essentially indexical features [Recanati]
     Full Idea: I defend the applicability of the indexical model to singular thought, and to mental files qua vehicles of singular thought. Mental files, I will argue, possess the essential features of indexicals.
     From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 05.1)
     A reaction: I love mental files, but am now (thanks to Cappelen and Dever) deeply averse to giving great significance to indexicals. A revised account of files will be needed.
Indexicality is closely related to singularity, exploiting our direct relations with things [Recanati]
     Full Idea: Singularity and indexicality are closely related: for indexicals systematically exploit the contextual relations in which we stand to what we talk about.
     From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 2.2)
     A reaction: Recanati builds a nice case that we may only have an ontology of singular objects because we conceptualise and refer to things in a particular way. He denies the ontology, but that's the bit that interests me.
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
Files can be confused, if two files correctly have a single name, or one file has two names [Recanati]
     Full Idea: Paderewski cases are cases in which a subject associates two distinct files with a single name. Inverse Paderewski cases are cases in which there are two names but the subject associates them with a single file.
     From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 10.1)
     A reaction: In the inverse there are two people with the same name, and someone thinks they are one person (with their combined virtues and vices). E.g. Einstein the famous physicist, and Einstein the famous musicologist. What a man!
Encylopedic files have further epistemic links, beyond the basic one [Recanati]
     Full Idea: The reference of a file is the object to which the subject stands in the relevant epistemic relation. In the case of encylopedic entries there is an arbitrary number of distinct relations. The file grows new links in an opportunistic manner.
     From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 11.3)
     A reaction: I'm not convinced by Recanati's claim that encylopedic files are a distinct type. My files seem to grow these opportunistic links right from their inception. All files seem to have that feature. A file could have four links at its moment of launching.
Singular thoughts need a mental file, and an acquaintance relation from file to object [Recanati]
     Full Idea: The mental file framework rests on two principles: that the subject cannot entertain a singular thought about an object without possessing and exercising a mental file about it, and that this requires an acquaintance relation with the object.
     From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 12.3)
     A reaction: I'm puzzled by the case where I design and build a completely new object. I seem to assemble a file, and only bestow singularity on it towards the end. Or the singularity can just be a placeholder, referred to as 'something'. […see p.158]
Expected acquaintance can create a thought-vehicle file, but without singular content [Recanati]
     Full Idea: On my view, actual acquaintance is not necessary to open a mental file; expected acquaintance will suffice; yet opening a mental file itself is not sufficient to entertain a singular thought-content. It only enables a thought-vehicle.
     From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 13.1)
     A reaction: I'm not clear why I can't create a file with no expectation at all of acquaintance, as in a fictional case. Depends what 'acquaintance' means. Recanati longs for precise distinctions where they may not be available.
An 'indexed' file marks a file which simulates the mental file of some other person [Recanati]
     Full Idea: Files function metarepresentationally if they serve to represent how other subjects think about objects in the world. ..An 'indexed' file has an index referring to the other subject whose files the indexed file stands for or simulates.
     From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 14.1)
     A reaction: Presumably there is an implicit index on all files, which says in a conversation whether my interlocutor does or does not hold the same file-type as me. Recanati wants many 'types' of files, but I suspect there is just one file type.
Reference by mental files is Millian, in emphasising acquaintance, rather than satisfaction [Recanati]
     Full Idea: The mental file account preserves the original, Millian inspiration of direct reference theories in giving pride of place to acquaintance relations and downplaying satisfaction factors.
     From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 17.3)
     A reaction: I find this a very satisfying picture, in which reference links to the simple label of a file (which could be a number), and not to its contents. There are tricky cases of non-existents, fictional entities and purely possible entities to consider.
The reference of a file is fixed by what it relates to, not the information it contains [Recanati]
     Full Idea: What files refer to is not determined by properties which the subject takes the referent to have (information, or misinformation, in the file), but through the relations on which the files are based.
     From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 3.3)
     A reaction: Maybe. 'Lot 22'. I can build up a hypothetical file by saying 'Imagine an animal which is F, G, H…', and build a reference that relates to nothing. Maybe Recanati overestimates the role of his 'epistemically rewarding' relations in file creation.
A mental file treats all of its contents as concerning one object [Recanati]
     Full Idea: The role of a mental file is precisely to treat all the information as if it concerned one and the same object, from which it derives.
     From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 4.1)
     A reaction: Recanati's book focuses entirely on singular objects, but we presumably have files for properties, generalisation, groups etc. Can they only be thought about if they are reified? Maybe.
There are transient 'demonstrative' files, habitual 'recognitional' files, cumulative 'encyclopedic' files [Recanati]
     Full Idea: A 'demonstrative' file only exists during the demonstrative relation to something; …a 'recognitional' file is based on 'familiarity' (a disposition to recognise); …an 'encylopedic' file contains all the information on something, however it is gained.
     From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 6.1-3)
     A reaction: [picked as samples of his taxonomy, pp.70-73] I'm OK with this as long as he doesn't think the categories are sharply separated. I'm inclined to think of files as a single type, drifting in and out of different of modes.
Files are hierarchical: proto-files, then first-order, then higher-order encyclopedic [Recanati]
     Full Idea: There is a hierarchy of files. Proto-files are the most basic; conceptual files are generated from them. First-order ones are more basic, as the higher-order encylopedic entries presuppose them.
     From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 6.3)
     A reaction: This hierarchy might fit into a decent account of categories, if a plausible one could be found. A good prospect for exploring categories would be to start with mental file-types, and work outwards through their relations.
A file has a 'nucleus' through its relation to the object, and a 'periphery' of links to other files [Recanati]
     Full Idea: I take a file to have a dual structure, with a 'nucleus' of the file consisting of information derived through the relevant epistemically rewarding relation, while the 'periphery' consists of information derived through linking with other files.
     From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 8.3)
     A reaction: This sounds strikingly like essentialism to me, though what constitutes the essence is different from the usual explanatory basics. The link, though, is in the causal connection. If we naturally 'essentialise', that will control file-formation.
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
The content of thought is what is required to understand it (which involves hearers) [Recanati]
     Full Idea: As Evans emphasises, what matters when we want to individuate semantic content is what would count as a proper understanding of an utterance; but 'understanding' defines the task of the hearer.
     From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 16.2)
     A reaction: [cites Evans 1982: 92, 143n, 171] I like to place (following Aristotle) understanding at the centre of all of philosophy, so this seems to me an appealing idea. It makes misunderstandings interesting.
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Mental files are individual concepts (thought constituents) [Recanati]
     Full Idea: I want mental files (properly speaking) to serve as individual concepts, i.e. thought constituents.
     From: François Recanati (Mental Files [2012], 5.3)
     A reaction: This is why the concept of mental files is so neat - it gives you a theory of reference and a theory of concepts. I love the files approach because it precisely fits my own introspective experiences. Hope I'm not odd in that way.