Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Walking the Tightrope of Reason', 'Letters to Frege' and 'The Fragmentation of Reason'

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3 ideas

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Stich accepts eliminativism (labelled 'pragmatism') about rationality and normativity [Stich, by Engel]
     Full Idea: Stich accepts a form of eliminativism (which he calls 'pragmatism') about rationality and normativity generally.
     From: report of Stephen P. Stich (The Fragmentation of Reason [1990]) by Pascal Engel - Truth §5.3
     A reaction: This seems to be the correct position for a Humean empiricist connectionist. Presumably he has some good reasons for eliminating rationality.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
We are also irrational, with a unique ability to believe in bizarre self-created fictions [Fogelin]
     Full Idea: We as human beings are also irrational animals, unique among animals in our capacity to place faith in bizarre fictions of our own construction.
     From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Intro)
     A reaction: This is glaringly true, and a very nice corrective to the talk of Greeks and others about man as the 'rational animal'. From a distance we might be described by Martians as the 'mad animal'. Is the irrational current too strong to swim against?
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert [Russell]
     Full Idea: I believe Mont Blanc itself is a component part of what is actually asserted in the proposition 'Mont Blanc is more than 4000 metres high'; we do not assert the thought, which is a private psychological matter, but the object of the thought.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Letters to Frege [1902], 1904.12.12), quoted by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude Ch.4
     A reaction: This would appear to be pretty much externalism about concepts, given that Russell would accept that other people know much more about Mont Blanc than he does, and their knowledge is included in what he asserts.