display all the ideas for this combination of texts
5 ideas
| 4405 | The attainment of truth is the task of the intellectual part of the soul [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The attainment of truth is the task of both the intellectual parts of the soul (calculation and deliberation). | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1139b10) | |
| A reaction: Obviously true, I would have thought, and equally true of the evolved brain, though there are plenty of people out there who try to deny it. |
| 5160 | There is a mean of feelings, as in our responses to the good or bad fortune of others [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: There are mean states also in the sphere of feelings. …The man who feels righteous indignation is distressed at instances of undeserved good fortune, but the envious man is distressed at any good fortune, and the spiteful man rejoices at bad fortune. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1108a29) | |
| A reaction: This example captures nicely the crucial point that Aristotle wants our actions and responses to be appropriate, rather than just restrained. The disciple of Aristotle does not conduct himself like a cold Stoic, but has lively responses to situations. |
| 4326 | Aristotle gives a superior account of rationality, because he allows emotions to participate [Hursthouse on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle gives a superior account of human rationality, because he allows emotions to participate in reason, rather than being mere animal, non-rational impulses. | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Rosalind Hursthouse - On Virtue Ethics Intro | |
| A reaction: This is obviously helpful in virtue ethics, but it is a bit questionable, if the core of rationality is 'giving reasons'. A feeling might be a reason, but only once it has been conceptualised. "For RLS, his feelings were his reasons", said Henry James. |
| 72 | Assume our reason is in two parts, one for permanent first principles, and one for variable things [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Assume the rational soul has two parts, one to contemplate things with invariable first principles, one to contemplate variable things. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1139a06) | |
| A reaction: 'Assume' is interesting. He presumably isn't asserting this division as a fact. So his methodology is make assumptions - probably as aids to clear thinking. |
| 16383 | Puzzled Pierre has two mental files about the same object [Recanati on Kripke] |
| Full Idea: In Kripke's puzzle about belief, the subject has two distinct mental files about one and the same object. | |
| From: comment on Saul A. Kripke (A Puzzle about Belief [1979]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 17.1 | |
| A reaction: [Pierre distinguishes 'London' from 'Londres'] The Kripkean puzzle is presented as very deep, but I have always felt there was a simple explanation, and I suspect that this is it (though I will leave the reader to think it through, as I'm very busy…). |