display all the ideas for this combination of texts
12 ideas
23951 | Emotion is a modification of bodily energy, controlling our actions [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: By emotion [affectus] I understand the modification of energy of the body by which the power of action is aided or restrained. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675]), quoted by Robert C. Solomon - The Passions 3.4 | |
A reaction: [no ref given] Solomon gives this as the earliest version of the 'hydraulic' model of emotions, later found in Freud and Jung. Very unusual to give a wholly physical account of these psychic states. |
23990 | The three primary emotions are pleasure, pain, and desire [Spinoza, by Goldie] |
Full Idea: Spinoza held that the three primary emotions are pleasure, pain, and desire | |
From: report of Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], III P59) by Peter Goldie - The Emotions 4 'Evidence' | |
A reaction: If you are aiming for a minimal list, this is quite good. One active, one good passive, one bad passive. Output and input. |
4849 | The three primary emotions are pleasure, pain and desire [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: I recognise only three primitive or primary emotions, namely, pleasure, pain and desire. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], IIIEm Df 4) | |
A reaction: Interesting, but hard to justify. Presumably one can analyse fear as desire for no pain, and grief as desire for the return of pleasure, etc. It is a nice exercise in introspective psychology, but I don't feel much wiser for it. |
17203 | Minds are subject to passions if they have inadequate ideas [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: The mind is subject to passions in proportion to the number of inadequate ideas which it has. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], III Pr 01) | |
A reaction: An exceptionally intellectualist view of emotions! |
4864 | An emotion is only bad if it hinders us from thinking [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: An emotion is only bad or hurtful, in so far as it hinders the mind from being able to think. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], V Pr 09) | |
A reaction: This sounds sensible. It fits Spinoza's quasi-stoicism that he should be happy with emotion (as natural), but also that true 'living by nature' requires control by reason. Only a wild romantic would think emotion better than judgement as a guide. |
7832 | Stoics want to suppress emotions, but Spinoza overcomes them with higher emotions [Spinoza, by Stewart,M] |
Full Idea: Spinoza says the only way to overcome emotions is with higher emotions, thus distinguishing himself from the Stoics, who argued that the only thing to do with the surly crowd of human emotions is to have them all shot. | |
From: report of Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675]) by Matthew Stewart - The Courtier and the Heretic Ch.10 | |
A reaction: The modern view would certainly be that the Stoics were responsible for massive problems in European civilization (thought the Buddhist have similar views). Emotions are now seen as integral even to very pure reasoning. |
4863 | An emotion comes more under our control in proportion to how well it is known to us [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: An emotion becomes more under our control, and the mind is less passive in respect to it, in proportion as it is more known to us. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], V Pr 03) | |
A reaction: This may sound a little optimistic, but it is also obviously true, in the sense that the only proper control we have of our own behaviour is through thought and judgement, which presuppose awareness of what needs controlling. |
4841 | People make calculation mistakes by misjudging the figures, not calculating them wrongly [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: When men make mistakes in calculation, they have one set of figures in their mind, and another on the paper. If we could see into their minds, they do not make a mistake. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], II Pr 47) | |
A reaction: A wonderfully optimistic assertion of faith in reason! He seems to imply an infallibility in reason, which seems a bit implausible. If I make 7+6=14, MUST I have muddled the 6 with a 7? Presumably Spinoza was good at arithmetic. |
20311 | An idea involves affirmation or negation [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: An idea, insofar as it is an idea, involves an affirmation or negation. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], II Pr 49 sII) | |
A reaction: Spinoza clearly distinguishes ideas from images, and here seems to identify ideas with propositions. Nowadays we say these are 'true or false', but Spinoza is more personal and psychological. I prefer his way of putting it. |
4830 | An 'idea' is a mental conception which is actively formed by the mind in thinking [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: By 'idea', I mean the mental conception which is formed by the mind as a thinking thing (this is not a passive perception with regard to the object, but expresses an activity of the mind). | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], II Def 3) | |
A reaction: This is interesting as a seventeenth century attempt to grapple with the nature of thought. Spinoza sees it as of the essence of mind, since it is what the mind contributes, rather than what happens to the mind when it experiences. |
21807 | Ideas are powerful entities, which can produce further ideas [Spinoza, by Schmid] |
Full Idea: Spinoza conceives of ideas as intrinsically powerful entities, which have a capacity to produce further ideas. | |
From: report of Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675]) by Stephan Schmid - Faculties in Early Modern Philosophy 6 | |
A reaction: Is the idea the source of the entire philosophy of Hegel? I find Hegel's claim to infer huge chains of ideas from very simple origins quite implausible. I also rather doubt whether a wholly isolated idea can produce a further idea. |
4842 | Ideas are not images formed in the brain, but are the conceptions of thought [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: By ideas I do not mean images such as are formed at the back of the eye, or in the midst of the brain, but the conceptions of thought. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], II Pr 48) | |
A reaction: This appears to be equating 'ideas' with what we now call 'concepts', which presumably makes Spinoza less open to criticism than other philosophers of his time, for postulating baffling mental copies of the world. |