display all the ideas for this combination of texts
8 ideas
| 9870 | Early Frege takes the extensions of concepts for granted [Frege, by Dummett] |
| Full Idea: In the 'Grundlagen' Frege takes the notion of the extension of a concept for granted as unproblematic. | |
| From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]) by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics Ch.16 | |
| A reaction: This comfortable notion was undermined by Russell's discovery of a concept which couldn't have an extension. Maybe we could defeat the Russell problem (and return to Frege's common sense) by denying that sets are objects. |
| 13878 | Concepts are, precisely, the references of predicates [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| Full Idea: For Frege concepts are, precisely, the Bedeutungen of predicates. | |
| From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]) by Crispin Wright - Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects 1.iv | |
| A reaction: On p.17 Wright challenges Frege's right to make that assumption. |
| 7736 | A concept is a non-psychological one-place function asserting something of an object [Frege, by Weiner] |
| Full Idea: A concept is a one-place function - something that can be asserted of an object - as found in 'Earth is a planet' and 'Venus is a planet'. This notion of concept does not belong to psychology at all. | |
| From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]) by Joan Weiner - Frege Ch.4 | |
| A reaction: This doesn't seem to leave room for the concept of the object or substance of which the something is asserted. In 'x is a planet' we need a concept of what x is. But then Frege will reduce the reference to a set of descriptions (i.e. functions). |
| 17430 | Fregean concepts have precise boundaries and universal applicability [Frege, by Koslicki] |
| Full Idea: Both precise boundaries and universal applicability are built into the very notion of a Fregean concept from the outset, while isolation and non-arbitrary division are additional criteria imposed on concepts. | |
| From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]) by Kathrin Koslicki - Isolation and Non-arbitrary Division 2.1 | |
| A reaction: The latter two criteria are for concepts which create counting units. |
| 8622 | Psychological accounts of concepts are subjective, and ultimately destroy truth [Frege] |
| Full Idea: Defining concepts psychologically, in terms of the nature of the human mind, makes everything subjective, and if we follow it through to the end, does away with truth. | |
| From: Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This is the reason for Frege's passionate opposition to psychological approaches to thought. The problem, though, is to give an account in which the fixity of truth connects to the fluctuations of mental life. How does it do that?? |
| 9190 | A concept is a function mapping objects onto truth-values, if they fall under the concept [Frege, by Dummett] |
| Full Idea: In later Frege, a concept could be taken as a particular case of a function, mapping every object on to one of the truth-values (T or F), according as to whether, as we should ordinarily say, that object fell under the concept or not. | |
| From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 1 (Basic Laws) [1893]) by Michael Dummett - The Philosophy of Mathematics 3.5 | |
| A reaction: As so often in these attempts at explanation, this sounds circular. You can't decide whether an object truly falls under a concept, if you haven't already got the concept. His troubles all arise (I say) because he scorns abstractionist accounts. |
| 13665 | Frege took the study of concepts to be part of logic [Frege, by Shapiro] |
| Full Idea: Frege took the study of concepts and their extensions to be within logic. | |
| From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 1 (Basic Laws) [1893]) by Stewart Shapiro - Foundations without Foundationalism 7.1 | |
| A reaction: This is part of the plan to make logic a universal language (see Idea 13664). I disagree with this, and with the general logicist view of the position of logic. The logical approach thins concepts out. See Deleuze/Guattari's horror at this. |
| 8651 | A concept is a possible predicate of a singular judgement [Frege] |
| Full Idea: A concept is for me that which can be predicate of a singular judgement-content. | |
| From: Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], §66 n) | |
| A reaction: This seems intuitively odd, given that a predicate could (in principle) be of almost infinite complexity, whereas I would be reluctant to call anything a 'concept' if it couldn't be grasped by a single action of a normal conscious mind. |