display all the ideas for this combination of texts
8 ideas
| 3462 | We don't postulate folk psychology, we experience it [Searle] |
| Full Idea: We do not postulate beliefs and desires to account for anything; we simply experience conscious beliefs and desires. | |
| From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 2 App) | |
| A reaction: Searle is too fond of reporting what we 'simply' know. Beliefs and desires are pushed forward by a cultural tradition. What I actually experience is a confusion, always laced with emotion. |
| 3498 | Computation isn't a natural phenomenon, it is a way of seeing phenomena [Searle] |
| Full Idea: Computational states are not discovered within the physics, they are assigned to the physics. | |
| From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 9.V) | |
| A reaction: The key idea in Searle's later thinking, with which I have some sympathy. There always seems to be a sneaky dualism buried deep in Searle's physicalism. Computation is very high-level physics. |
| 3492 | Content is much more than just sentence meaning [Searle] |
| Full Idea: Sentence meaning radically underdetermines the content of what is said. | |
| From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 8.II) | |
| A reaction: We have body language, and we have tone, and we have context, and we have speaker's and listener's meanings. I take sentence meaning to be the basis which makes the rest possible. |
| 4100 | The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false. [Crane] |
| Full Idea: The Twin Earth argument does not refute internalism, since it depends on the 'Content-Determines-Reference' principle, which internalists can reject. | |
| From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 4.37) | |
| A reaction: The idea is that content should be understood in a context (e.g. on a particular planet). Indexicals count against a totally narrow view of content (Twins thinking 'I am here'). |
| 3464 | There is no such thing as 'wide content' [Searle] |
| Full Idea: I don't believe in the existence of 'wide content'. | |
| From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 3.IV) | |
| A reaction: I sort of agree, but if I accept the rulings of experts (e.g. that water is really H2O), I am admitting that what I mean may not be in my head. |
| 4067 | Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought [Crane] |
| Full Idea: If a mental state is broad, then the existence of the mental state entails the existence of its object. | |
| From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 1.7) | |
| A reaction: Hence thinking of non-existent things like unicorns is problematic for externalists. However, externalists can think about numbers or Platonic ideals. |
| 3506 | We explain behaviour in terms of actual internal representations in the agent [Searle] |
| Full Idea: In intentional explanations of behaviour patterns in the behaviour are explained by the fact that the agent has a representation of that very pattern in its intentional apparatus, which functions causally in the production of the behaviour. | |
| From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch.10.IV) | |
| A reaction: Problem cases would be where someone's behaviour doesn't come out quite as planned (e.g. the sentence spoken failed to match the proposition intended), and panic behaviour. |
| 4063 | In intensional contexts, truth depends on how extensions are conceived. [Crane] |
| Full Idea: Intensional contexts are those where truth or falsehood depends on the way the extensions are conceived. | |
| From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 1.4) | |
| A reaction: An important distinction for anyone defending an internalist view of concepts or of knowledge |