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Ideas for '', 'Philosophical Investigations' and 'Propositions'

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4 ideas

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 10. Rule Following
An 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: An 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §580)
     A reaction: Why do processes need 'criteria'? I have never understood why I can't have private criteria, or at least private modifications of public criteria.
Every course of action can either accord or conflict with a rule, so there is no accord or conflict [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: Paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. Answer: if everything can accord with the rule, then everything can conflict with it, so there is no accord or conflict.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §201)
     A reaction: This is a very interesting claim which goes beyond the private language question. It seems to imply, for example, Dancy's 'Particularism' about morality, which is a general rejection of rules and principles in moral thought.
One cannot obey a rule 'privately', because that is a practice, not the same as thinking one is obeying [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: 'Obeying a rule' is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §202)
     A reaction: The core of the Private Language argument. But if I drive on the right erroneously thinking it is the law, I can still make progress until I meet someone.
If individuals can't tell if they are following a rule, how does a community do it? [Grayling on Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: The problem facing a putative private language-user - namely, that he cannot tell whether he is, or only thinks he is, following a rule - also faces the community as a whole; how does the community tell whether it is following a rule?
     From: comment on Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §580) by A.C. Grayling - Wittgenstein Ch.3
     A reaction: Nice question. If you really get into the sceptical frame of mind that Wittgenstein reached about rules, almost everything seems impossible. How can I move? How can I speak? How can one instant follow another? How can I understand a word?