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Ideas for
'fragments/reports', 'LOT 2' and 'Infinitism solution to regress problem'
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13 ideas
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
12658
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Nobody knows how concepts are acquired [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
12662
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We have an innate capacity to form a concept, once we have grasped the stereotype [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
12635
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Having a concept isn't a pragmatic matter, but being able to think about the concept [Fodor]
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12652
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Concepts have two sides; they are files that face thought, and also face subject-matter [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
12626
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Cartesians put concept individuation before concept possession [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
12637
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Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference [Fodor]
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12638
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If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers [Fodor]
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12639
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Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
12654
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You can't think 'brown dog' without thinking 'brown' and 'dog' [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
12659
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Maybe stereotypes are a stage in concept acquisition (rather than a by-product) [Fodor]
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12660
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One stereotype might be a paradigm for two difference concepts [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / g. Conceptual atomism
12629
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For the referential view of thought, the content of a concept is just its reference [Fodor]
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12631
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Compositionality requires that concepts be atomic [Fodor]
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