Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Conspectus libelli (book outline)', 'Analogy of Religion' and 'LOT 2'
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21 ideas
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
12641
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Connectionism gives no account of how constituents make complex concepts [Fodor]
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12640
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Associative thinking avoids syntax, but can't preserve sense, reference or truth [Fodor]
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18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
12643
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Ambiguities in English are the classic reason for claiming that we don't think in English [Fodor]
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18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
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We think in file names [Fodor]
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12647
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Mental representations name things in the world, but also files in our memory [Fodor]
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18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
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Frame Problem: how to eliminate most beliefs as irrelevant, without searching them? [Fodor]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
12630
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If concept content is reference, then my Twin and I are referring to the same stuff [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
12658
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Nobody knows how concepts are acquired [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
12662
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We have an innate capacity to form a concept, once we have grasped the stereotype [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
12635
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Having a concept isn't a pragmatic matter, but being able to think about the concept [Fodor]
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12652
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Concepts have two sides; they are files that face thought, and also face subject-matter [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
12626
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Cartesians put concept individuation before concept possession [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
12639
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Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes [Fodor]
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12637
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Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference [Fodor]
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12638
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If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
12654
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You can't think 'brown dog' without thinking 'brown' and 'dog' [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
12659
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Maybe stereotypes are a stage in concept acquisition (rather than a by-product) [Fodor]
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12660
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One stereotype might be a paradigm for two difference concepts [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / g. Conceptual atomism
12629
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For the referential view of thought, the content of a concept is just its reference [Fodor]
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12631
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Compositionality requires that concepts be atomic [Fodor]
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18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
12657
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Abstractionism claims that instances provide criteria for what is shared [Fodor]
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