Combining Texts
Ideas for
'The Elm and the Expert', 'Sameness and Substance' and 'Phil of Mathematics: why nothing works'
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these texts
display all the ideas for this combination of texts
10 ideas
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
|
2440
|
Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way [Fodor]
|
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
|
2450
|
Rationality has mental properties - autonomy, productivity, experiment [Fodor]
|
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
|
2437
|
XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility [Fodor]
|
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
|
2441
|
Truth conditions require a broad concept of content [Fodor]
|
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
|
3114
|
Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff [Fodor]
|
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
|
2452
|
Knowing the cause of a thought is almost knowing its content [Fodor]
|
18. Thought / C. Content / 12. Informational Semantics
|
2432
|
Is content basically information, fixed externally? [Fodor]
|
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
|
16518
|
We conceptualise objects, but they impinge on us [Wiggins]
|
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
|
2438
|
In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions [Fodor]
|
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
|
16511
|
A 'conception' of a horse is a full theory of what it is (and not just the 'concept') [Wiggins]
|