Combining Texts
Ideas for
'The Elm and the Expert', 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind' and 'The Scope and Language of Science'
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16 ideas
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
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6648
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Some behaviourists believe thought is just suppressed speech [Lowe]
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
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2440
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Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way [Fodor]
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
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2450
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Rationality has mental properties - autonomy, productivity, experiment [Fodor]
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
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6651
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People are wildly inaccurate in estimating probabilities about an observed event [Lowe]
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6652
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'Base rate neglect' makes people favour the evidence over its background [Lowe]
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18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
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6655
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The 'Frame Problem' is how to program the appropriate application of general knowledge [Lowe]
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6657
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Computers can't be rational, because they lack motivation and curiosity [Lowe]
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18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / c. Turing Test
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6656
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The Turing test is too behaviourist, and too verbal in its methods [Lowe]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
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6636
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The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory [Lowe]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
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2437
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XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility [Fodor]
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6633
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Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical [Lowe]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
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2441
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Truth conditions require a broad concept of content [Fodor]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
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3114
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Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff [Fodor]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
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2452
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Knowing the cause of a thought is almost knowing its content [Fodor]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 12. Informational Semantics
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2432
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Is content basically information, fixed externally? [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
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2438
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In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions [Fodor]
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