Combining Texts
Ideas for
'works', 'In a Critical Condition' and 'Psychosemantics'
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23 ideas
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
2992
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We may be able to explain rationality mechanically [Fodor]
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2476
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The goal of thought is to understand the world, not instantly sort it into conceptual categories [Fodor]
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
1651
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Plato wanted to somehow control and purify the passions [Vlastos on Plato]
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
2988
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Folk psychology is the only explanation of behaviour we have [Fodor]
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18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 3. Modularity of Mind
2499
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Modules analyse stimuli, they don't tell you what to do [Fodor]
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2496
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Blindness doesn't destroy spatial concepts [Fodor]
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2498
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Modules make the world manageable [Fodor]
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2500
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Babies talk in consistent patterns [Fodor]
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2507
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Rationality rises above modules [Fodor]
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2497
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Something must take an overview of the modules [Fodor]
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2509
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Modules have in-built specialist information [Fodor]
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2491
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Modules have encapsulation, inaccessibility, private concepts, innateness [Fodor]
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2495
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Obvious modules are language and commonsense explanation [Fodor]
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18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
2483
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Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning [Fodor]
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2480
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Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't [Fodor]
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2487
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Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language [Fodor]
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3010
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Belief and desire are structured states, which need mentalese [Fodor]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
2999
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Obsession with narrow content leads to various sorts of hopeless anti-realism [Fodor]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 9. Conceptual Role Semantics
2486
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Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content [Fodor]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
3012
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Do identical thoughts have identical causal roles? [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
2492
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Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience [Fodor]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
2471
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Are concepts best seen as capacities? [Fodor]
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2472
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For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something [Fodor]
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