Combining Texts
Ideas for
'works', 'Mental Content' and 'Philosophical Investigations'
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22 ideas
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
23950
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Freud said passions are pressures of some flowing hydraulic quantity [Freud, by Solomon]
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18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 10. Rule Following
6165
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Every course of action can either accord or conflict with a rule, so there is no accord or conflict [Wittgenstein]
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4143
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One cannot obey a rule 'privately', because that is a practice, not the same as thinking one is obeying [Wittgenstein]
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7092
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If individuals can't tell if they are following a rule, how does a community do it? [Grayling on Wittgenstein]
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4158
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An 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria [Wittgenstein]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
23795
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Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions [Schulte]
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23806
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Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science [Schulte]
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23796
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Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented [Schulte]
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23792
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Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united [Schulte]
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23804
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Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties [Schulte]
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23793
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On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow [Schulte]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
4138
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Is white simple, or does it consist of the colours of the rainbow? [Wittgenstein]
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7055
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Externalist accounts of mental content begin in Wittgenstein [Wittgenstein, by Heil]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 9. Conceptual Role Semantics
23802
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Conceptual role semantics says content is determined by cognitive role [Schulte]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
23797
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Cause won't explain content, because one cause can produce several contents [Schulte]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 11. Teleological Semantics
23799
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Teleosemantics explains content in terms of successful and unsuccessful functioning [Schulte]
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23800
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Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions [Schulte]
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18. Thought / C. Content / 12. Informational Semantics
23798
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Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable [Schulte]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
12576
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Possessing a concept is knowing how to go on [Wittgenstein, by Peacocke]
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4157
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Concepts direct our interests and investigations, and express those interests [Wittgenstein]
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12606
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Man learns the concept of the past by remembering [Wittgenstein]
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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / h. Family resemblance
4141
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Various games have a 'family resemblance', as their similarities overlap and criss-cross [Wittgenstein]
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