display all the ideas for this combination of texts
5 ideas
7883 | Verificationists tend to infer indefinite answers from undecidable questions [Papineau] |
Full Idea: The verificationist sin is to infer an indefiniteness of answers immediately from the undecidability of questions. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 7.02) | |
A reaction: This remark is aimed at Dummett's anti-realism. It strikes me that what is being described really is a sort of arrogance, in believing that reality can somehow be inferred from studying the epistemic apparatus of a few miserable little mammals. |
4001 | The meaning of a word contains all its possible uses as well as its actual ones [Nagel] |
Full Idea: The meaning of a word contains all its possible uses, true and false, not only its actual ones. | |
From: Thomas Nagel (What Does It All Mean? [1987], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: It has always seemed to me that meaning is not use, because you can't use it if it hasn't already got a meaning. What use is a meaningless word? |
7872 | Teleosemantics equates meaning with the item the concept is intended to track [Papineau] |
Full Idea: The teleosemantic view of perceptual concepts is that the referential value of the concept can be equated with those items which it is the biological function of the concept to track. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 4.6) | |
A reaction: This seems to work quite nicely for 'bird', which is concept which is used to track birds. It might even work for complex entities, or abstract entities, or even negative entities. Imagination must play a role in that last one. |
7869 | Truth conditions in possible worlds can't handle statements about impossibilities [Papineau] |
Full Idea: Basing content on possible worlds that result in truth leaves no room for thoughts about genuine impossibilities, since there are not possible worlds whose actuality would make an 'impossible thought' true. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 3.7) | |
A reaction: Negative existentials like 'no rabbits in this room' and 'no snakes in this room' seem to have the same truth conditions as well. I suppose the sentences must be translated into a logical form which suits the theory, with negation stuck on the end. |
7868 | Thought content is possible worlds that make the thought true; if that includes the actual world, it's true [Papineau] |
Full Idea: The content of our thoughts can be equated with those possible worlds whose actuality would make the thought true. On this model, a true thought is one whose content includes the actual world, while a false thought is one whose content does not. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 3.7) | |
A reaction: This is the possible worlds semantics version of truth conditions theories of meaning. Papineau offers a nice difficulty for the theory (Idea 7869). Dummett says the whole approach is circular, because content precedes truth. |