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Ideas for 'The Epistemology of Modality', 'Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language' and 'Logical Foundations of Probability'

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2 ideas

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
Kripke's Wittgenstein says meaning 'vanishes into thin air' [Kripke, by Miller,A]
     Full Idea: Quine and Kripke's Wittgenstein attempt to argue that there are no facts about meaning, that the notion of meaning, as Kripke puts it, 'vanishes into thin air'.
     From: report of Saul A. Kripke (Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language [1982]) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language Pref
     A reaction: A tempting solution to the problem. If, though, it is possible for someone to say something that is self-evidently meaningless, or to accuse someone of speaking (deep down) without meaning, then that needs explaining.
If you ask what is in your mind for following the addition rule, meaning just seems to vanish [Kripke]
     Full Idea: What can there be in my mind that I make use of when I follow a general rule to add in the future? It seems that the entire idea of meaning vanishes into thin air.
     From: Saul A. Kripke (Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language [1982], 2)
     A reaction: Introspection probably isn't the best way to investigate the phenomenon of meaning. Indeed it seems rather old-fashioned and Cartesian. Kripke says, though, that seeking 'tacit' rules is even worse [end of note 22].