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3 ideas
9583 | Psychological logicians are concerned with sense of words, but mathematicians study the reference [Frege] |
Full Idea: The psychological logicians are concerned with the sense of the words and with the presentations, which they do not distinguish from the sense; but the mathematicians are concerned with the matter itself, with the reference of the words. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Review of Husserl's 'Phil of Arithmetic' [1894], p.326) | |
A reaction: This is helpful for showing the point of his sense/reference distinction; it is part of his campaign against psychologism, by showing that there is a non-psychological component to language - the reference, where it meets the public world. |
9584 | Identity baffles psychologists, since A and B must be presented differently to identify them [Frege] |
Full Idea: The relation of sameness remains puzzling to a psychological logician. They cannot say 'A is the same as B', because that requires distinguishing A from B, so that these would have to be different presentations. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Review of Husserl's 'Phil of Arithmetic' [1894], p.327) | |
A reaction: This is why Frege needed the concept of reference, so that identity could be outside the mind (as in Hesperus = Phosophorus). Think about an electron; now think about a different electron. |
20949 | Study the use of words, not their origins [Herder] |
Full Idea: Not how an expression can be etymologically derived and determined analytically, but how it is used is the question. Origin and use are often very different. | |
From: Johann Gottfried Herder (works [1784], p.153), quoted by Andrew Bowie - Introduction to German Philosophy 2 'Herder' | |
A reaction: This doesn't quite say that meaning is use, and is basically an attack on the Etymological Fallacy (that origin gives meaning), but it is a strikingly modern view of language. |