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21624 | It is known that there is a cognitive loss in identifying propositions with possible worlds [Williamson] |
Full Idea: It is well known that when a proposition is identified with the set of possible worlds at which it is true, a region in the space of possible worlds, cognitively significant distinctions are lost. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Vagueness [1994], 7.6) | |
A reaction: Alas, he doesn't specify which distinctions get lost, so this is just a pointer. It would seem likely that two propositions could have identical sets of possible worlds, while not actually saying the same thing. Equilateral/equiangular. |
16298 | We need propositions to ascribe the same beliefs to people with different languages [Halbach] |
Full Idea: Being able to ascribe the same proposition as a belief to persons who do not have a common language seems to be one of the main reasons to employ propositions. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 2) | |
A reaction: Propositions concern beliefs, as well as sentence meanings. I would want to say that a dog and I could believe the same thing, and that is a non-linguistic reason to believe in propositions. Maybe 'translation' cuts out the proposition middleman? |