display all the ideas for this combination of texts
21 ideas
23450 | Wittgenstein rejected his earlier view that the form of language is the form of the world [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M] |
Full Idea: Wittgenstein's later work rejects the central thesis of the Tractatus's philosophy of language, that the form of language is the same as the form of the world. | |
From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952]) by Michael Morris - Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus Intro.4 | |
A reaction: I associate the earlier view with the stoic belief that nature is wholly rational, and that our reasoning can match it. I take it for granted that language largely matches the world, but we must explain why so many people believe absurdities. |
4150 | Asking about verification is only one way of asking about the meaning of a proposition [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: Asking whether and how a proposition can be verified is only a particular way of asking 'How do you mean?' The answer is a contribution to the grammar of the proposition. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §353) | |
A reaction: 'How' a proposition is verified seems utterly irrelevant. What situation in reality provides the verification must have something to do with the meaning. Cat-on-mat is what counts, not whether you see it, hear it or smell it. |
4137 | In the majority of cases the meaning of a word is its use in the language [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: For a large class of cases - though not for all - the meaning of a word is its use in the language. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §043) | |
A reaction: Defended by Paul Horwich, but I don't like this. If "swordfish" is a password, its meaning and its use are miles apart. Meaning connects to reality, but use doesn't. |
6567 | For Wittgenstein, words are defined by their use, just as chess pieces are [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
Full Idea: For Wittgenstein, just as pieces in a game such as chess are defined by the rules that govern their moves, the meanings of words are similarly defined by the rules that govern their employment. | |
From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.2 | |
A reaction: Fogelin's note points out that it is more complex than this. It is hard to dispute the chess case, but while words like 'and' and 'not' may be given entirely functional definitions, others don't work like that: John, run, red, solid, pain, ow! …. |
6169 | We do not achieve meaning and understanding in our heads, but in the world [Wittgenstein, by Rowlands] |
Full Idea: For Wittgenstein, meaning and understanding are not things that we do or achieve in our heads; they are things we achieve in the world. | |
From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §202) by Mark Rowlands - Externalism Ch.5 | |
A reaction: Can't we achieve anything in our heads? Mental arithmetic seems to be fairly mental, unless we are going to be absurdly behaviouristic. If we can achieve some things in our heads, why not lots of things? |
4155 | We all seem able to see quite clearly how sentences represent things when we use them [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: It it be asked, "How do sentences manage to represent?" the answer might be, "Don't you know? You certainly see it when you use them." For nothing is concealed. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §435) | |
A reaction: A tool isn't its use, even though it becomes obvious how a tool works when it is used. It has a use because it has a certain nature or property. |
4142 | To understand a sentence means to understand a language [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: To understand a sentence means to understand a language. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §198) | |
A reaction: Does this make learning a language logically impossible? Helen Keller only knew one word at the beginning. |
4149 | We don't have 'meanings' in our minds in addition to verbal expressions [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: When I think in language, there aren't 'meanings' going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §329) | |
A reaction: No, but words have properties, like being meaningful, or long, or beautiful. They are not abstractions, or empty counters which can be used for anything. |
4156 | Make the following experiment: say "It's cold here" and mean "It's warm here" [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: Make the following experiment: say "It's cold here" and mean "It's warm here". | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §510) | |
A reaction: A lovely experiment, whatever it proves. It is easier if the meaning is the truth, rather than the words. I try to weld a new word onto my experience. |
4145 | How do words refer to sensations? [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: How do words refer to sensations? | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §244) | |
A reaction: A very nice question, to be remembered when discussing how we refer to beauty, gold, water or the present King of France. |
4140 | The standard metre in Paris is neither one metre long nor not one metre long [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is one metre long, nor that it is not one metre long, and that is the standard metre in Paris. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §050) | |
A reaction: The remark which inspired Kripke's causal theory. Clearly W. is wrong, because it is one metre long, but why is it that length? |
11240 | The notion of analytic truth is absent in Aristotle [Aristotle, by Politis] |
Full Idea: The notion of analytic truth is conspicuously absent in Aristotle. | |
From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 1.5 | |
A reaction: Cf. Idea 11239. |
4136 | To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §019) | |
A reaction: I take this to be about the transparency of language, but it supports meaning as truth conditions, rather than as use. |
6166 | Was Wittgenstein's problem between individual and community, or between occasions for an individual? [Rowlands on Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: There are two interpretations of Wittgenstein here: the community interpretation sees error in a rule between the individual and the community, where the individual interpretation sees the problem between repeated occasions in the use of a sign. | |
From: comment on Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §202) by Mark Rowlands - Externalism Ch.5 | |
A reaction: Rowlands brings out how a lot hangs on which of these two interpretations we opt for, but also that if the individual has a problem, this may logically imply the same problem for the community. The individual interpretation would be a deeper problem. |
7875 | If a brilliant child invented a name for a private sensation, it couldn't communicate it [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: Let's assume the child is a genius and itself invents a name for the sensation! - But then, of course, he couldn't make himself understood when he used the word. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §257) | |
A reaction: [His example is a sensation with no behaviour] Sensations are not just related to behaviour; they are related to external objects, and to parts of the body. We doubt the sensations of others if they can't name the object or the body part. |
4146 | We cannot doublecheck mental images for correctness (or confirm news with many copies of the paper) [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: If the mental image of a train timetable cannot itself be tested for correctness, how can it confirm the correctness of the first memory? (As if someone were to buy several copies of the morning paper to assure himself that what it said was true). | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §265) | |
A reaction: An important point for the epistemological sceptic. Could God do an infinite regress of checks on the truth of his mental images? |
4147 | If we only named pain by our own case, it would be like naming beetles by looking in a private box [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: If someone says he only knows what pain is from his own case, suppose everyone had a box with something in it (a 'beetle'). We can't see into other boxes, so we say what a beetle is by looking in our own box. The contents of each box could be different. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §293) | |
A reaction: But pain is private. Children must guess the meaning of parts of the language that refer to inner experience, like 'sad' or 'hopeful'. Body language brings our private concepts together, but error seems possible. |
5659 | If the reference is private, that is incompatible with the sense being public [Wittgenstein, by Scruton] |
Full Idea: Wittgenstein's claim is that the assumption that the reference is private (being observable to one person alone) is incompatible with the hypothesis that the sense is public. | |
From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §293) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.19 | |
A reaction: An illuminating summary, showing the link between the private language argument and modern 'externalism' about the meaning of concepts (e.g. Idea 4099). I still don't find Wittgenstein's claim conclusive. Something is definitely private. |
4152 | Getting from perceptions to words cannot be a private matter; the rules need an institution of use [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: I could not apply any rules to a private transition from what is seen to words. Here the rules really would hang in the air; for the institution of their use is lacking. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §380) | |
A reaction: That puts the argument nicely. In studying art or wine you learn what to say about your private experiences. |
4144 | Common human behaviour enables us to interpret an unknown language [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: The common behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §206) | |
A reaction: This is a behaviourist spin on the idea of charity, but it leads to Davidson's assumption that most alien beliefs must be true. |
11049 | To communicate, language needs agreement in judgment as well as definition [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §242) | |
A reaction: If someone is locked into a highly alien viewpoint, then communication with them does seem to be virtually impossible. Amenability to reason, and consensus on elementary facts, seems to be the sine qua non of communication. |