Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Saundaranandakavya', 'Perpetual Peace' and 'Realistic Rationalism'

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4 ideas

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
2517 Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz]
     Full Idea: In linguistics there are two schools of thought: Bloomfieldian structuralism (favoured by Quine) conceives of sentences acoustically and meanings behaviouristically; and Chomskian generative grammar (which is silent about semantics).
     From: Jerrold J. Katz (Realistic Rationalism [2000], Int.xxiv)
     A reaction: They both appear to be wrong, so there is (or was) something rotten in the state of linguistics. Are the only options for meaning either behaviourist or eliminativist?
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
2519 It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz]
     Full Idea: There is virtually universal acceptance of Frege's definition of sense as the determiner of reference.
     From: Jerrold J. Katz (Realistic Rationalism [2000], Int.xxvi)
     A reaction: Not any more, since Kripke and Putnam. It is one thing to say sense determines reference, and quite another to say that this is the definition of sense.
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
2520 Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz]
     Full Idea: Pace Frege, sense determines sense properties and relations, like meaningfulness and synonymy, rather than determining referential properties, like denotation and truth.
     From: Jerrold J. Katz (Realistic Rationalism [2000], Int.xxvi)
     A reaction: This leaves room for Fregean 'sense', after Kripke has demolished the idea that sense determines reference.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
2518 Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz]
     Full Idea: Sentences are types, not utterance tokens or mental/neural tokens, and hence sentences are abstract objects (like musical scores).
     From: Jerrold J. Katz (Realistic Rationalism [2000], Int.xxvi)
     A reaction: If sentences are abstract types, then two verbally indistinguishable sentences are the same sentence. But if I say 'I am happy', that isn't the same as you saying it.