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4 ideas
18992 | Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them [Yablo] |
Full Idea: A sentence's meaning is to do with its truth-value in various possible scenarios, AND the factors responsible for that truth-value. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], Intro) | |
A reaction: The thesis of his book, which I welcome. I'm increasingly struck by the way in which much modern philosophy settles for a theory being complete, when actually further explanation is possible. Exhibit A is functional explanations. Why that function? |
18994 | The content of an assertion can be quite different from compositional content [Yablo] |
Full Idea: Assertive content - what a sentence is heard as saying - can be at quite a distance from compositional content. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], Intro) | |
A reaction: This is the obvious reason why semantics cannot be entirely compositional, since there is nearly always a contextual component which then has to be added. In the case of irony, the compositional content is entirely reversed. |
18997 | Truth-conditions as subject-matter has problems of relevance, short cut, and reversal [Yablo] |
Full Idea: If the subject-matter of S is how it is true, we get three unfortunate results: S has truth-value in worlds where its subject-matter draws a blank; learning what S is about tells you its truth-value; negating S changes what it's about. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], 02.8) | |
A reaction: Together these make fairly devastating objections to the truth-conditions (in possible worlds) theory of meaning. The first-objection concerns when S is false |
19005 | Not-A is too strong to just erase an improper assertion, because it actually reverses A [Yablo] |
Full Idea: The idea that negation is, or can be, a cancellation device raises an interesting question. What does one do to wipe the slate clean after an improper assertion? Not-A is too strong; it reverses our stand on A rather than nullifying it. | |
From: Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], 09.8) | |
A reaction: [He is discussing a remark of Strawson 1952] It seems that 'not' has two meanings or uses: a weak use of 'nullifying' an assertion, and a strong use of 'reversing' an assertion. One could do both: 'that's not right; in fact, it's just the opposite'. |