display all the ideas for this combination of texts
8 ideas
8168 | To know the truth-conditions of a sentence, you must already know the meaning [Dummett] |
Full Idea: You can know the condition for a sentence to be true only when you know what the sentence means. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Thought and Reality [1997], 3) | |
A reaction: This makes the truth-conditions theory of meaning circular, and is Dummett's big objection to Davidson's view. The composition of a sentence creates a model of a world. Truth-conditions may only presuppose knowledge of concepts. |
8181 | A justificationist theory of meaning leads to the rejection of classical logic [Dummett] |
Full Idea: If we adopt a justificationist theory of meaning, we must reject the universal law of excluded middle, and with it classical logic (which rests on the two-valued semantics of bivalence). We admit only intuitionist logic, which preserves justifiability. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Thought and Reality [1997], 5) | |
A reaction: This is Dummett's philosophy in a very neat nutshell. He seems to have started by accepting Brouwer's intuitionism, and then working back to language. It all implies anti-realism. I don't buy it. |
8182 | Verificationism could be realist, if we imagined the verification by a superhuman power [Dummett] |
Full Idea: There is a possible route to realism, which has been called 'ideal verificationism', if we base our grasping the understanding and truth of a range of sentences on the procedure that would be available to an imagined being with superhuman powers. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Thought and Reality [1997], 5) | |
A reaction: This is actually a slippery slope for verificationists, as soon as they allow that verification could be done by other people. A verifier might turn up who had telepathy, or x-ray vision, or could see quarks... |
8183 | If truths about the past depend on memories and current evidence, the past will change [Dummett] |
Full Idea: If justificationists succumb to the temptation for statements in the past, we shall view their senses as given by present memories and present traces of past events; but this will force us into a view of the past as itself changing. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Thought and Reality [1997], 6) | |
A reaction: Obviously Dummett attempts to sidestep this problem, but it strikes me as powerful support for the realist view about the past. How can we not be committed to the view that there are facts about the past quite unconnected to our verifying abilities? |
8176 | We could only guess the meanings of 'true' and 'false' when sentences were used [Dummett] |
Full Idea: Even if we guessed that the two words denoted the two truth-values, we should not know which stood for the value 'true' and which for the value 'false' until we knew how the sentences were in practice used. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Thought and Reality [1997], 4) | |
A reaction: These types of problem are always based on the idea that some one item must have logical priority in the process, but there is a lot of room for benign circularity in the development of mental and linguistic functions. |
8170 | Sentences are the primary semantic units, because they can say something [Dummett] |
Full Idea: While words are semantic atoms, sentences remain the primary semantic units, in the sense of the smallest bits of language by means of which it is possible to say anything. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Thought and Reality [1997], 3) | |
A reaction: Syncategorematic terms (look it up!) may need sentences, but most nouns and verbs can communicate quite a lot on their own. Whether words or sentences come first may not be a true/false issue. |
20787 | A proposition is what can be asserted or denied on its own [Chrysippus] |
Full Idea: A proposition is what can be asserted or denied on its own, for example, 'It is day' or 'Dion is walking'. | |
From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.65 | |
A reaction: Note the phrase 'on its own'. If you say 'it is day and Dion is walking', that can't be denied on its own, because first the two halves must each be evaluated, so presumably that doesn't count as a stoic proposition. |
8169 | We can't distinguish a proposition from its content [Dummett] |
Full Idea: No distinction can be drawn between a proposition and its content; no two distinct propositions can have the same content. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Thought and Reality [1997], 3) | |
A reaction: And one proposition cannot have two possible contents (ambiguity). Are we to say that a proposition supervenes on its content, or that proposition and content are identical? Ockham favours the latter. |