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Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Epistemology Naturalized' and 'Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86'

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4 ideas

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Inculcations of meanings of words rests ultimately on sensory evidence [Quine]
     Full Idea: All inculcation of meanings of words must rest ultimately on sensory evidence.
     From: Willard Quine (Epistemology Naturalized [1968], p.75)
     A reaction: This betrays Quine's behaviourist tendencies, and rules out introspection, definitions and inferences. Quine's conclusion is fairly total scepticism about meaning, but that is not surprising, given his external and meaningless starting point.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Thought starts as ambiguity, in need of interpretation and narrowing [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: A thought in the shape in which it comes is an ambiguous sign that needs interpretation, more precisely, needs an arbitrary narrowing-down and limitation, until it finally becomes unambiguous.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1885-86 [1886], 38[01])
     A reaction: This is exactly my view of propositions, as mental events. Introspect your thinking process. Track the progress from the first glimmer of a thought to its formulation in a finished sentence. Language, unlike propositions, can be ambiguous.
A proposition is what can be asserted or denied on its own [Chrysippus]
     Full Idea: A proposition is what can be asserted or denied on its own, for example, 'It is day' or 'Dion is walking'.
     From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.65
     A reaction: Note the phrase 'on its own'. If you say 'it is day and Dion is walking', that can't be denied on its own, because first the two halves must each be evaluated, so presumably that doesn't count as a stoic proposition.
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
In observation sentences, we could substitute community acceptance for analyticity [Quine]
     Full Idea: Perhaps the controversial notion of analyticity can be dispensed with, in our definition of observation sentences, in favour of the straightforward attitude of community-wide acceptance.
     From: Willard Quine (Epistemology Naturalized [1968], p.86)
     A reaction: That might be a reasonable account of 'bachelors'. If the whole community accepts 'God exists', does that make it analytic? If a whole (small!) community claims to actually observe a ghost or a flying saucer, is that then analytic?