15589
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The two main theories are Holism (which is inferential), and Representational (which is atomistic) [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
For holists a proper theory will be broadly inferential, while for their opponents it will be representational in character, describing relations between expressions and reality. Representational semantics is atomist, holist semantics inferential.
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From:
Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], Intro)
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A reaction:
Fine presents these as the two main schools in semantics. His own theory then proposes a more holistic version of the Representational view. He seeks the advantages of Frege's position, but without 'sense'.
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15598
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We should pursue semantic facts as stated by truths in theories (and not put the theories first!) [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
A 'semantics' is a body of semantic facts, and a 'semantic theory' is a body of semantic truths. The natural order is a theory being understood as truths, which state facts. Davidson, alas, reversed this order, with facts understood through theories.
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From:
Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 2.C)
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A reaction:
[compressed; he cites Davidson 1967, and calls it 'one of the most unfortunate tendencies in modern philosophy of language, ..as if chemistry were understood in terms of formulae rather than chemical facts'].
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15600
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Referentialist semantics has objects for names, properties for predicates, and propositions for connectives [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
The standard referentialist semantics for a language with names is that the semantic value of the name is the object, the content of a predicate is a property, and the content of a logical connective is an operation on propositions.
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From:
Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 2.F)
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A reaction:
My particular bęte noire is the idea that every predicate names a property. It is the tyranny of having to have a comprehensive semantic theory that drives this implausible picture. And I don't see how an object can be a semantic value…
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15601
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Fregeans approach the world through sense, Referentialists through reference [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
Fregeans emphasise an orientation towards the speaker: possession of sense makes language meaningful, and language relates to the world through sense. For the Referentialist its representational relationships make it meaningful, and relate it to the world
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From:
Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 2.G)
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A reaction:
The Referentialist approach is for Kripkean fans of direct reference, rather than the Fregean reference through descriptions. I am inclined to favour the old-fashioned, deeply discredited, much mocked Fregean approach.
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