6899
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The references of indexicals ('there', 'now', 'I') depend on the circumstances of utterance [Mautner]
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Full Idea:
Indexicals are expressions whose references depend on the circumstances of utterance, such as 'here', 'now', 'last month' 'I', 'you'. It was introduced by Peirce; Reichenbach called them 'token-reflexive', Russell 'ego-centric particulars'.
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From:
Thomas Mautner (Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy [1996], p.272)
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A reaction:
Peirce's terminology seems best. They obviously create great problems for any theory of reference which is rather theoretical and linguistic, such as by the use of descriptions. You can't understand 'Look at that!' without practical awareness.
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19164
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If propositions are facts, then false and true propositions are indistinguishable [Davidson on Russell]
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Full Idea:
Russell often treated propositions as facts, but discovered that correspondence then became useless for explaining truth, since every meaningful expression, true or false, expresses a proposition.
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From:
comment on Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903]) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 6
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A reaction:
So 'pigs fly' would have to mean pigs actually flying (which they don't). They might correspond to possible situations, but only if pigs might fly. What do you make of 'circles are square'? Russell had many a sleepless night over that.
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19157
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Russell said the proposition must explain its own unity - or else objective truth is impossible [Russell, by Davidson]
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Full Idea:
Moore and Russell reacted strongly against the idea that the unity of the proposition depended on human acts of judgement. ...Russell decided that unless the unity is explained in terms of the proposition itself, there can be no objective truth.
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From:
report of Bertrand Russell (The Principles of Mathematics [1903], p.42) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 5
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A reaction:
Put like this, the Russellian view strikes me as false. Effectively he is saying that a unified proposition is the same as a fact. I take a proposition to be a brain event, best labelled by Frege as a 'thought'. Thoughts may not even have parts.
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