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Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Is Hume's Principle analytic?' and 'Semantic Relationism'

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7 ideas

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics

15596	The standard aim of semantics is to assign a semantic value to each expression [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: The aim of semantics, as standardly conceived, is to assign a semantic value to each (meaningful) expression of the language under consideration.
	From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 1.G)
	A reaction: Fine is raising the difficulty that these values can get entangled with one another. He proposes 'semantic connections' as a better aim.

15587	That two utterances say the same thing may not be intrinsic to them, but involve their relationships [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: In my 'Semantic Relationism' the fact that two utterances say the same thing is not entirely a matter of their intrinsic semantic features; it may also turn on semantic relationships among the utterances of their parts not reducible to those features.
	From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], Intro)
	A reaction: You'll need to read the book slowly several times to get the hang of this, but at least it allows that two different utterances might say the same thing (express the same proposition, I would say).

15589	The two main theories are Holism (which is inferential), and Representational (which is atomistic) [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: For holists a proper theory will be broadly inferential, while for their opponents it will be representational in character, describing relations between expressions and reality. Representational semantics is atomist, holist semantics inferential.
	From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], Intro)
	A reaction: Fine presents these as the two main schools in semantics. His own theory then proposes a more holistic version of the Representational view. He seeks the advantages of Frege's position, but without 'sense'.

15598	We should pursue semantic facts as stated by truths in theories (and not put the theories first!) [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: A 'semantics' is a body of semantic facts, and a 'semantic theory' is a body of semantic truths. The natural order is a theory being understood as truths, which state facts. Davidson, alas, reversed this order, with facts understood through theories.
	From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 2.C)
	A reaction: [compressed; he cites Davidson 1967, and calls it 'one of the most unfortunate tendencies in modern philosophy of language, ..as if chemistry were understood in terms of formulae rather than chemical facts'].

15600	Referentialist semantics has objects for names, properties for predicates, and propositions for connectives [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: The standard referentialist semantics for a language with names is that the semantic value of the name is the object, the content of a predicate is a property, and the content of a logical connective is an operation on propositions.
	From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 2.F)
	A reaction: My particular bête noire is the idea that every predicate names a property. It is the tyranny of having to have a comprehensive semantic theory that drives this implausible picture. And I don't see how an object can be a semantic value…

15601	Fregeans approach the world through sense, Referentialists through reference [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: Fregeans emphasise an orientation towards the speaker: possession of sense makes language meaningful, and language relates to the world through sense. For the Referentialist its representational relationships make it meaningful, and relate it to the world
	From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], 2.G)
	A reaction: The Referentialist approach is for Kripkean fans of direct reference, rather than the Fregean reference through descriptions. I am inclined to favour the old-fashioned, deeply discredited, much mocked Fregean approach.

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics

15605	I take indexicals such as 'this' and 'that' to be linked to some associated demonstration [Fine,K]
	Full Idea: Demonstrative uses of an indexical such as 'this' or 'that' should be taken to be anaphoric on an associated demonstration. It is a semantic requirement on the use of the indexical that it be coreferential with the demonstration.
	From: Kit Fine (Semantic Relationism [2007], Post 'Indexicals')
	A reaction: Similarly 'now' must connect to looking at a clock, and 'I' to pointing at some person. The demonstration could be of a verbal event, as much as a physical one.