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2 ideas
| 9547 | Mathematical entities are causally inert, so the causal theory of reference won't work for them [Chihara] |
| Full Idea: Causal theories of reference seem doomed to failure for the case of reference to mathematical entities, since such entities are evidently causally inert. | |
| From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 01.3) | |
| A reaction: Presumably you could baptise a fictional entity such as 'Polonius', and initiate a social causal chain, with a tradition of reference. You could baptise a baby in absentia. |
| 18862 | Are propositions all the thoughts and sentences that are possible? [Tallant] |
| Full Idea: One might be tempted to the view that there are as many different propositions as there are thoughts that could be thought and sentences that could be uttered. | |
| From: Jonathan Tallant (Metaphysics: an introduction [2011], 04.5.3) | |
| A reaction: A fairly orthodox view I take to be crazy. I think it is a view designed for logic, rather than for how the world is. Why tie propositions to what can be thought, and then introduce unthought propositions? Why no unthinkable propositions? |