display all the ideas for this combination of texts
4 ideas
| 9370 | A statement is analytic if substitution of synonyms can make it a logical truth [Frege, by Boghossian] |
| Full Idea: According to Frege, a statement's analyticity (in my epistemological sense) is to be explained by the fact that it is transformable into a logical truth by the substitution of synonyms for synonyms. | |
| From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], §03) by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered §I | |
| A reaction: [He says this interpretation of Frege's semantical notion of analyticity may be controversial] Presumably we see that 'bachelors are unmarried men' is analytic when we start substituting for 'bachelor'. Sounds reasonable. |
| 8743 | Frege considered analyticity to be an epistemic concept [Frege, by Shapiro] |
| Full Idea: Frege held that analyticity is like a priority in being an epistemic concept. | |
| From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], §03) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 5.1 | |
| A reaction: Kripke very firmly says that this is not so. While a priori is an epistemic concept, analyticity is a semantic concept. I cling on to Kripke's framework, but probably more because it is neat and comfortable than because it is true. |
| 20295 | All analytic truths can become logical truths, by substituting definitions or synonyms [Frege, by Rey] |
| Full Idea: Frege appealed to definition, or (if 'meaning' is preserved) synonymy: the non-logical analytic truths can be converted to logical truths by substitution of definitions for defined terms, or synonyms for synonyms. | |
| From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], §005, 88) by Georges Rey - The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction 1.2 | |
| A reaction: This is a 'dogma of empiricism' attacked by Quine. It seems rather obvious (with hindsight?) that you can smuggle whatever is required to do the job into your definition. Or assert some slightly dubious synonymy. |
| 2515 | Frege fails to give a concept of analyticity, so he fails to explain synthetic a priori truth that way [Katz on Frege] |
| Full Idea: Frege's approach provides no concept of analyticity (hence Quine's attack), so there is no notion of the analytic a priori under which to bring the metaphysician's synthetic a priori propositions. | |
| From: comment on Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]) by Jerrold J. Katz - Realistic Rationalism Int.xxi | |
| A reaction: So Frege might have been a logical positivist, if only he had given himself the right tools for the job? |