display all the ideas for this combination of texts
5 ideas
| 7872 | Teleosemantics equates meaning with the item the concept is intended to track [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: The teleosemantic view of perceptual concepts is that the referential value of the concept can be equated with those items which it is the biological function of the concept to track. | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 4.6) | |
| A reaction: This seems to work quite nicely for 'bird', which is concept which is used to track birds. It might even work for complex entities, or abstract entities, or even negative entities. Imagination must play a role in that last one. |
| 16469 | Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Plantinga, by Stalnaker] |
| Full Idea: The domains in Plantinga's interpretation of Kripke's semantics are sets of essences, and the values of variables are essences. The values of predicates have to be functions from possible worlds to essences. | |
| From: report of Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 4.4 | |
| A reaction: I begin to think this is quite nice, as long as one doesn't take the commitment to the essences too seriously. For 'essence' read 'minimal identity'? But I take essences to be more than minimal, so use identities (which Kripke does?). |
| 16470 | Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy [Stalnaker on Plantinga] |
| Full Idea: For Plantinga, essences are entities in their own right and will have properties different from what instantiates them. Hence he will need individual essences of individual essences, distinct from the essences. I see no way to avoid a hierarchy of them. | |
| From: comment on Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 4.4 | |
| A reaction: This sounds devastating for Plantinga, but it is a challenge for traditional Aristotelians. Only a logician suffers from a hierarchy, but a scientist might have to live with an essence, which contains a super-essence. |
| 7869 | Truth conditions in possible worlds can't handle statements about impossibilities [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: Basing content on possible worlds that result in truth leaves no room for thoughts about genuine impossibilities, since there are not possible worlds whose actuality would make an 'impossible thought' true. | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 3.7) | |
| A reaction: Negative existentials like 'no rabbits in this room' and 'no snakes in this room' seem to have the same truth conditions as well. I suppose the sentences must be translated into a logical form which suits the theory, with negation stuck on the end. |
| 7868 | Thought content is possible worlds that make the thought true; if that includes the actual world, it's true [Papineau] |
| Full Idea: The content of our thoughts can be equated with those possible worlds whose actuality would make the thought true. On this model, a true thought is one whose content includes the actual world, while a false thought is one whose content does not. | |
| From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 3.7) | |
| A reaction: This is the possible worlds semantics version of truth conditions theories of meaning. Papineau offers a nice difficulty for the theory (Idea 7869). Dummett says the whole approach is circular, because content precedes truth. |