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Ideas for 'Philosophical Essay on Probability', 'The Philosophy of Philosophy' and 'Articulating Reasons: Intro to Inferentialism'

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2 ideas

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
The use of a sentence is its commitments and entitlements [Brandom, by Lycan]
     Full Idea: Brandom develops a particular conception of 'use', according to which a sentence's use is the set of commitments and entitlements associated with public utterance of that sentence.
     From: report of Robert B. Brandom (Articulating Reasons: Intro to Inferentialism [2000]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language Ch.6
     A reaction: It immediately strikes me that a sentence could only have commitments and entitlements if it already had a meaning. However, the case of money shows how there might be nothing more to a thing's significance than its entitlements.
You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson]
     Full Idea: Someone who acquires the word 'gob' just by being reliably told that it is synonymous with 'mouth' knows what 'gob' means without being fully competent to use it.
     From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], 4.7)
     A reaction: Not exactly an argument against meaning-as-use, but a very nice cautionary example to show that 'knowing the meaning' of a word may be a rather limited, and dangerous, achievement.