display all the ideas for this combination of texts
3 ideas
| 8533 | Predicates need ontological correlates to ensure that they apply [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: Must there not be something quite specific about the thing which allows, indeed ensures, that predicates like 'underneath' and 'hot' apply? The predicates require ontological correlates. | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (Properties [1992], §1) | |
| A reaction: An interesting proposal, that in addition to making use of predicates, we should 'ensure that they apply'. Sounds verificationist. Obvious problem cases would be speculative, controversial or metaphorical predicates. "He's beneath contempt". |
| 4035 | There must be some explanation of why certain predicates are applicable to certain objects [Armstrong] |
| Full Idea: When we have said that predicates apply to objects, we have surely not said enough. The situation cries out for an explanation. Must there not be something specific about the things which allows, indeed ensures, that these predicates apply? | |
| From: David M. Armstrong (Properties [1992], §1) | |
| A reaction: A nice challenge to any philosopher who places too much emphasis on language. A random and arbitrary (nominalist?) language simply wouldn't work. Nature has joints. |
| 3324 | Plato's whole philosophy may be based on being duped by reification - a figure of speech [Benardete,JA on Plato] |
| Full Idea: Plato is liable to the charge of having been duped by a figure of speech, albeit the most profound of all, the trope of reification. | |
| From: comment on Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.12 | |
| A reaction: That might be a plausible account if his view was ridiculous, but given how many powerful friends Plato has, especially in the philosophy of mathematics, we should assume he was cleverer than that. |