display all the ideas for this combination of texts
7 ideas
| 7716 | Words were devised as signs for inner ideas, and their basic meaning is those ideas [Locke] |
| Full Idea: It was necessary that man should find some external sensible signs, whereby those invisible ideas might be made known to others; ..words, then, in their primary or immediate signification stand for nothing but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them. | |
| From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 3.02.01-2) | |
| A reaction: This very unpopular theory could be defended. Note Locke's qualification about 'primary signification'. His Wittgensteinian opponents go on about community or communication, but maybe these are parasitic on the initial grunt referring to an inner idea? |
| 7308 | Words stand for the ideas in the mind of him that uses them [Locke] |
| Full Idea: Words in their primary or immediate signification, stand for nothing, but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them. | |
| From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 3.02.02) | |
| A reaction: This is notorious and usually dismissed contemptuously. However, if the ideas themselves 'stand for' reality, our words are not just trapped in mental space. If my mental space contains things, presumably we can name them. |
| 8477 | People presume meanings exist because they confuse meaning and reference [Orenstein] |
| Full Idea: A good part of the confidence people have that there are meanings rests on the confusion of meaning and reference. | |
| From: Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.6) | |
| A reaction: An important point. Everyone assumes that sentences link to the world, but Frege shows that that is not part of meaning. Words like prepositions and conjunctions ('to', 'and') don't have 'a meaning' apart from their function and use. |
| 12524 | For the correct reference of complex ideas, we can only refer to experts [Locke] |
| Full Idea: We have nothing else to refer these our ideas of mixed modes to as standard, to which we would conform them, but the ideas of those who are thought to use those names in their most proper significations. | |
| From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.32.12) | |
| A reaction: This is Putnam's thought about elm trees, that he uses the word 'elm' to refer to something the reference of which is fixed by experts on trees, and not by his ignorant self. |
| 8471 | Three ways for 'Socrates is human' to be true are nominalist, platonist, or Montague's way [Orenstein] |
| Full Idea: 'Socrates is human' is true if 1) subject referent is identical with a predicate referent (Nominalism), 2) subject reference member of the predicate set, or the subject has that property (Platonism), 3) predicate set a member of the subject set (Montague) | |
| From: Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: Orenstein offers these as alternatives to Quine's 'inscrutability of reference' thesis, which makes the sense unanalysable. |
| 8484 | If two people believe the same proposition, this implies the existence of propositions [Orenstein] |
| Full Idea: If we can say 'there exists a p such that John believes p and Barbara believes p', logical forms such as this are cited as evidence for our ontological commitment to propositions. | |
| From: Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.7) | |
| A reaction: Opponents of propositions (such as Quine) will, of course, attempt to revise the logical form to eliminate the quantification over propositions. See Orenstein's outline on p.171. |
| 15991 | Since words are just conventional, we can represent our own ideas with any words we please [Locke] |
| Full Idea: Since sounds are voluntary and indifferent signs of any idea, a man may use what words he pleases to signify his own ideas to himself. | |
| From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 3.09.02) | |
| A reaction: Evidently not in tune with Wittgenstein, but it is obvious that I could invent any word I like for my favourite temperature for tomato soup. |