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2 ideas
10516 | A realistic view of reference is possible for concrete objects, but not for abstract objects [Dummett, by Hale] |
Full Idea: Dummett claims that a realistic conception of reference can be sustained for concrete objects (possible objects of ostension), but breaks down for (putative) names of (pure) abstract objects. | |
From: report of Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) by Bob Hale - Abstract Objects Ch.3.II | |
A reaction: An extremely hard claim to evaluate, because a case must first be made for abstract objects which are fundamentally different in kind. Realistic reference must certainly deal with these hard cases. Field rejects Dummett's abstract points. |
2436 | It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth) [Fodor] |
Full Idea: The standard view is that Frege cases [knowing Jocasta but not mother] show that reference doesn't determine sense, and Twin cases [knowing water but not H2O] show that sense doesn't determine reference. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §1.3) | |
A reaction: How about 'references don't contain much information', and 'descriptions may not fix what they are referring to'? Simple really. |