display all the ideas for this combination of texts
4 ideas
14999 | Prior to conventions, not all green things were green? [Sider] |
Full Idea: It is absurd to say that 'before we introduced our conventions, not all green things were green'. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 06.5) | |
A reaction: Well… Different cultures label the colours of the rainbow differently, and many of them omit orange. I suspect the blue/green borderline has shifted. |
3588 | Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences [Williams,M] |
Full Idea: In the foundationalist picture the meaning of individual words (defined ostensively) is primary, and that of sentences is derivative. For coherentists sentences come first, with meaning understood functionally or inferentially. | |
From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: Coherentism about language doesn't imply coherentism about justification. On language I vote for foundationalism, because I am impressed by the phenomenon of compositionality. |
14998 | Conventions are contingent and analytic truths are necessary, so that isn't their explanation [Sider] |
Full Idea: To suggest that analytic truths make statements about linguistic conventions is a nonstarter; statements about linguistic conventions are contingent, whereas the statements made by typical analytic sentences are necessary. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 06.5) | |
A reaction: That 'anything yellow is extended' is not just a convention should be fairly obvious, and it is obviously necessary. But we can say that bachelors are necessarily unmarried men - given the current convention. |
15016 | Analyticity has lost its traditional role, which relied on truth by convention [Sider] |
Full Idea: Nothing can fully play the role traditionally associated with analyticity, for much of that traditional role presupposed the doctrine of truth by convention. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 09.8) | |
A reaction: Sider rejects Quine's attack on analyticity, but accepts his critique of truth by convention. |