Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Essays on Intellectual Powers: Conception', 'Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols)' and 'Review of 'The Price is Wrong' by B.Christophers'

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6 ideas

19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
23646 Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description [Reid]
     Full Idea: An individual is expressed by a proper name, or by a general word joined to distinguishing circumstances; if unknown, it may be pointed out to the senses; when beyond the reach of the senses it may be picked out by an imperfect but true description.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1)
     A reaction: [compressed] If Putnam, Kripke and Donnellan had read this paragraph they could have save themselves a lot of work! I take reference to be the activity of speakers and writers, and these are the main tools of the trade.
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
23645 A word's meaning is the thing conceived, as fixed by linguistic experts [Reid]
     Full Idea: The meaning of a word (such as 'felony') is the thing conceived; and that meaning is the conception affixed to it by those who best understand the language.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 4: Conception [1785], 1)
     A reaction: He means legal experts. This is precisely that same as Putnam's account of the meaning of 'elm tree'. His discussion here of reference is the earliest I have encountered, and it is good common sense (for which Reid is famous).
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
22276 Bolzano saw propositions as objective entities, existing independently of us [Bolzano, by Potter]
     Full Idea: Bolzano took the entities of which truth is predicated to be not propositions in the subjective sense but 'propositions-in-themselves' - objective entities existing independent of our apprehension.
     From: report of Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 02 'Emp'
     A reaction: A serious mistake. Presumably the objective propositions are all true (or there would be endless infinities of them). So what is assessed in the case of error? Something other than the objective propositions! We assess these other things!
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
17264 Propositions are abstract structures of concepts, ready for judgement or assertion [Bolzano, by Correia/Schnieder]
     Full Idea: Bolzano conceived of propositions as abstract objects which are structured compounds of concepts and potential contents of judgements and assertions.
     From: report of Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837]) by Correia,F/Schnieder,B - Grounding: an opinionated introduction 2.3
     A reaction: Personally I think of propositions as brain events, the constituents of thought about the world, but that needn't contradict the view of them as 'abstract'.
12232 A 'proposition' is the sense of a linguistic expression, and can be true or false [Bolzano]
     Full Idea: What I mean by 'propositions' is not what the grammarians call a proposition, namely the linguistic expression, but the mere sense of this expression, is what is meant by proposition in itself or object proposition. This sense can be true or false.
     From: Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837], Pref?)
     A reaction: This seems to be the origin of what we understand by 'proposition'. The disputes are over whether such things exists, and whether they are features of minds or features of the world (resembling facts).
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
12233 The ground of a pure conceptual truth is only in other conceptual truths [Bolzano]
     Full Idea: We can find the ground of a pure conceptual truth only in other conceptual truths.
     From: Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837], Pref)
     A reaction: Elsewhere he insists that these grounds must be in 'truths', and not just in the attributes of the concepts of involved. This conflicts with Kit Fine's view, that the concepts themselves are the source of conceptual truth and necessity.