display all the ideas for this combination of texts
3 ideas
16298 | We need propositions to ascribe the same beliefs to people with different languages [Halbach] |
Full Idea: Being able to ascribe the same proposition as a belief to persons who do not have a common language seems to be one of the main reasons to employ propositions. | |
From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 2) | |
A reaction: Propositions concern beliefs, as well as sentence meanings. I would want to say that a dog and I could believe the same thing, and that is a non-linguistic reason to believe in propositions. Maybe 'translation' cuts out the proposition middleman? |
16491 | If we define 'this is not blue' as disbelief in 'this is blue', we eliminate 'not' as an ingredient of facts [Russell] |
Full Idea: We can reintroduce 'not' by a definition: the words 'this is not blue' are defined as expressing disbelief in what is expressed by the words 'this is blue'. In this way the need of 'not' as an indefinable constituent of facts is avoided. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Human Knowledge: its scope and limits [1948], 9) | |
A reaction: This is part of Russell's programme of giving a psychological account of logical connectives. See other ideas from his 1940 and 1948 works. He observes that disbelief is a state just as positive as belief. I love it. |
12338 | We must either assert or deny any single predicate of any single subject [Badiou] |
Full Idea: There can be nothing intermediate to an assertion and a denial. We must either assert or deny any single predicate of any single subject. | |
From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 1011b24) | |
A reaction: The first sentence seems to be bivalence, and the second sentence excluded middle. |