display all the ideas for this combination of texts
3 ideas
| 14475 | How can causal theories of reference handle nonexistence claims? [Thomasson] |
| Full Idea: Pure causal theories of reference have problems in handling nonexistence claims | |
| From: Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 02.3) | |
| A reaction: This is a very sound reason for shifting from a direct causal baptism view to one in which the baptism takes place by a social consensus. So there is a consensus about 'unicorns', but obviously no baptism. See Evans's 'Madagascar' example. |
| 14474 | Pure causal theories of reference have the 'qua problem', of what sort of things is being referred to [Thomasson] |
| Full Idea: Pure causal theories of reference face the 'qua problem' - that it may be radically indeterminate what the term refers to unless there is some very basic concept of what sort of thing is being referred to. | |
| From: Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 02.3) | |
| A reaction: She cites Dummett and Wiggins on this. There is an obvious problem that when I say 'look at that!' there are all sorts of conventions at work if my reference is to succeed. |
| 14488 | Analyticity is revealed through redundancy, as in 'He bought a house and a building' [Thomasson] |
| Full Idea: The analytic interrelations among elements of language become evident through redundancy. It is redundant to utter 'He bought a house and a building', since buying a house analytically entails that he bought a building. | |
| From: Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 09.4) | |
| A reaction: This appears to concern necessary class membership. It is only linguistically redundant if the class membership is obvious. Houses are familiar, uranium samples are not. |